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This essay is an attempt to further the development of
general explanations in the political and social dimension
of life by focusing upon a central component of modern soc-
iety—the political party. This task is assumed to be worth-
while and is held to be possible, 'because men seek to ex-
plain the world around them, and because explanations of
social phenomena are neither totally normative, nor empirical
but exhibit a gradual shifting of emphasis from what ought
to be to what is. This shift is facilitated by the con-
struction of analytical frameworks which advance empirical
theory development because of their utility in independent
variable recognition and classification.
It is our contention that the three broadest attempts
to explain the phenomenon political party, the Marxian
theory, the democratic responsible-party explanation, and
the taxonomies of Maurice Duverger are each a step toward
eventual general party theory. However, each of these ex-
planations contains serious weaknesses of orientation, in-
clusiveness, range and level of conceptualization. The
Marxian and responsible-party explanations are mutually ex-
clusive and of high normative content. The Marxian explan-
ation is general while the responsible-party or mandate
theory is of the middle range. Both exhibit inconsistencies
of conceptualization.
The "preliminary general theory of parties" of Maurice
Duverger is clearly empirical and is inclusive of both the
Marxian and mandate party explanations but is of little use
in explaining the parties and party systems of the Third
World. He gives us a conceptualization of parties primarily
as collectivities of individuals rather than patterned human
interactions producing consequences. As a result, his class-
ification schema are static rather than dynamic. They are
useful in development of a general party theory but as
Duverger himself modestly claims, only a preliminary step
in this direction.
The epistemological bases of the three explanations of
parties are analyzed from a positivist—subjectivist per-
spective. It is our position that general explanations of
human phenomena must be cognizant of both epistemological
traditions. Both Marx and Duverger largely ignore subjec-
tivism but for different reasons while Woodrow Wilson, as a
representative of the mandate party explanation, is quite
ambiguous
.
A suggested heuristic bridge between traditions is the
development of a model which is based upon commonalities of
function of all manifestations of the phenomenon party. This
search for shared functions, if successful, then allows us
to search for common variables and to trace out the inter-
play of these variables upon parties and party systems.
The functional bridge appropriate for our task is the
dynamic model of social stratification of Gerhard Lenski in
which he utilizes the concepts of both class and class sys-
tem. Lenski suggests that any society consists of dominant
and subservient class systems, each of which is comprised
of different classes. Every member of any society is both
a member of all class systems and also a member of a class
or power class within that system. This class membership
and the ranking of the class systems determines the allocation
of societal rewards of power, privilege and prestige.
It is our contention that political parties are the re-
sult of struggles for dominance in the allocation processes
of a society and that these struggles are of three major
types, (1) between class systems, (2) between classes, and
(3) between class systems and classes. Viewed from this
perspective, the static approach to party explanation of
Duverger is supplemented with a dynamic element of social
struggle over the distribution of rewards. Political parties
are prime actors in these struggles in contemporary societies.
From this perspective, new variables concerning many dimen-
sions of party and party system organization and activity
patterns can be isolated. This essay is presented as a
beginning in this direction.
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PREFACE
The original motivation for this study evolved from my
dissatisfaction with the mutually exclusive nature of the
"democratic" and "communist" explanations of political
parties. This situation became apparent to me during my
graduate student study at Amherst. I explored the limita-
tions of these explanations of political parties in a
master's thesis which in turn led to the present study.
It is my belief that empirically based explanations of
social science phenomena are possible and will eventually
be generated when the process of variable recognition is
more developed than at present. But this endeavor must be
guarded by a theoretical framework which both structures
the search and points the way to fruitful avenues of ex-
ploration. This essay is an attempt to move forward in the
accomplishment of the second objective. The static tax-
onomies of political parties provided by Maurice Duverger
are supplemented by the dynamic insights into social evol-
ution of Gerhard Lenski—insights resulting from his focus
upon the social division of societal rewards.
I feel a deep sense of appreciation toward Professors
Glen Gordon and Philip Coulter whose graduate seminar in
Political Sociology at the University of Massachusetts
developed in me an appreciation of the possibilities of
using sociological variables to explain political phenomena.
Professors Gerard Braunthal and. Howard .Wiarda have patiently
sustained my efforts over the years to complete this
-study.
Their suggestions have proved of great value to a student
who, in the beginning, failed to appreciate the magnitude
of his chosen task.
When ideas do not emerge, scholars can become short-
tempered and morose. My wife Norma has borne this with
little complaint. In addition, daughters Sharon and
Michelle have refrained from sarcastic remarks as I stared
at the ceiling. For these and other supports and motiva-
tions such as "When are you going to finish that thing?,
I offer sincere thanks to all.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION
Introduction
The primary purpose of this study is to advance our
understanding of one of the central components of political
life, the political party. Some voices are now being raised
concerning a possible excess of emphasis with regard to the
direct attention which this aspect of political life has been
attracting. It is our contention that parties are an inte-
gral part of government and politics in post-primitive soc-
ieties and are thus a necessary subject of continued study if
Political Science is to move toward more general explanations
of the political aspects of man in society. We are herein
attempting to advance the discipline two steps further toward
the eventual goal of a general empirical theory of parties.
The first step consists of an analysis and critique of the
work of contemporary general party theorists, and the second
step is a suggested means whereby we might begin to surmount
some of the methodological problems of party studies stated by
-'"Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies:
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity , Vol. #2, (Winter, 1969),
pp. 111-114.
1
2
such students of modern parties as Maurice Duverger 2 and
3Sigmund Neumann.
Explanation and understanding in political science, like
understanding and explanation in any field of inquiry, is a
cumulative enterprise. The development of a general theory
of parties must build upon prior relevant work. We will
examine the three explanations which have the most valid claim
to be regarded as general explanations of political parties.
Methodological standards of assessment to appraise these ex-
planations will be developed and applied to the "mandate,
responsible-government, " and the "Marxian-Communist, " and the
Duverger party explanatory frameworks
.
The second or methodological problem has been well out-
lined by both Duverger and Neumann. Duverger states: "We
find ourselves in a vicious circle: a general theory of
parties will eventually be constructed only upon preliminary
work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be
truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of
parties."^ Neumann assesses the problem in similar terms when
2Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization
and Activity in the Modern State , trans, by Barbara and Robert
North, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. xiii.
3
Sigmund Neumann, ed., "Why Study Political Parties,"
Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
4 . • •Duverger, p. xm.
he states
:
I
The question of a proper approach to a mean-
ingful theory of political party structure poses a
dilemma because the overwhelming data of our mat-
erial world fall into a conceivable pattern only
if seen through the controlled order of a concept-
ual framework, which in turn can be conceived only
in a full appreciation of the rich texture of
reality. The task of attempting to systematize
our knowledge therefore, is confronted by almost
overwhelming difficulties and can proceed only by
a simultaneous attack on both theory and practice. 5
This essay suggests an escape route from the "vicious circle"
of Duverger by presenting a heuristic model as one means of
surmounting the pitfalls inherent in reliance upon either
ideographic and descriptive case studies or the logico-
deductive mode of explanation in the Social Sciences, a mode
upon which Duverger relies and which he, and others, defend
as being appropriate to the present stage of development of
Social Science explanation.
The ultimate goal in inquiry, both in natural and social
science, is explanation. It is our contention that, because
of the nature of the subject matter of social science, complex
social man, exclusive reliance upon the deductive approach to
party explanation at the present stage of our knowledge of the
5Neumann, p. 4. In a more recent discussion of the
search for a general party theory, Lawrence C. Mayer is per-
haps less optimistic than Neumann. See his Comparative Pol-
itical Inquiry: A Methodological Survey , (Homewood , 111.:
The Dorsey Press, 1972), Chapter 11, "The Search for a Theory
of Parties .
"
4
phenomenon will inhibit our search for empirical theory. We
do not plead a case for normative theory, but rather suggest
and describe a middle course approach, that of analytical
modeling as a means to carry us toward our eventual goal of a
general empirical theory of political parties.
Basic Questions and Assumptions
The basic questions to be explored are: Why study pol-
itical parties? What are the limitations of various current
approaches to a general explanation of parties? What diffi-
culties does the social scientist encounter is attempting to
develop an empirical general theory of parties? What are the
alternatives available to enable the researcher to surmount
these apparent limitations?
The first of these questions will be dealt with below and
those remaining will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.
Parties will be presented as a central component of modern
society—a resultant of the mass participation ethos which has
been developing for the past two centuries—ever since revol-
utionary France of 1789 institutionalized the "democratic"
idea of popular, legitimate influence upon the ruling strata
of nation-states.
The inherent explanatory limitations of present approaches
to an understanding of parties will be presented within an
analytical framework of critique which emphasizes the implicit
values of the individual theorist, or, in the case of Duverger,
the lack of sufficient empirical rigor in what he presents as
his most valid generalization.
In order to develop a valid deductive theory it is nec-
essary to recognize and give valid weight of influence to all
variables seen as shaping in any way the dependent variable
which we are attempting to explain and understand. Thus, the
use of this methodological approach in the study of parties
—
an approach which is presently advocated by many philosophers
of science, ^ is premature in the study of the phenomenon pol-
itical party. We are not yet able to recognize many of the
independent variables much less quantify them. Our approach
to party explanation is to utilize a method which we believe
will not only break out of the "vicious circle" of Duverger,
but will also help to overcome the problem of relevant var-
iable recognition which inhibits the fully effective utili-
zation of the logico-deductive mode of explanation as applied
to the study of parties.
We will suggest that one way to circumvent the problems
of method in the study of parties is to utilize a functionally
6See, for example, Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery , (New York: Wiley, Science Editions, 1961).
6
based heuristic model. This device should allow us to by-
pass the inherent difficulties in both the narrow deductive
heuristic such as that employed by Anthony Downs, 7 and the
explanations of a general but value-laden type such as those
employed by Karl Marx and the "mandate" party theorists.
A basic assumption of this approach to party theory is
that most, if not all parties share certain functional char-
acteristics and that by emphasizing these functions by means
of a heuristic model and then their psychological and socio-
logical functions, conceptualization of similarities in
independent and intervening variables might be fruitful.
These concepts should then point to more hidden variables
which have heretofore been neglected and ignored.
A clarification regarding our use of the ambiguous words
"function" and "functional" is necessary if we are to avoid
the sort of criticism leveled by Robert E. Dowse 8 against
one of the leading proponents of the functionalist mode of
7
'Anthony Downs , An Economic Theory of Democracy
,
(New
York: Harper and Row, 1957)
.
p
"A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics
,
(July, 1966),
pp. 607-622. A similar criticism is also developed by Eugene
J. Meehan in Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical
Study
,
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 176.
7explanation, Gabriel A. Almond. 9 Dowse alleges that Almond
gives us a universal generalization regarding the seven
functions which all political systems perform but he does not
attempt to define his' use of the 'term function so that:
If the basic concept is not defined, it follows
that there is no conceptual limitation upon the pro-
liferation of categories: the classes of activity
ascribed to the political system are not derived from
a basic conceptual or propos itional framework.
. .
There is no reason why the number of functions sug-
gested for the political system should not have run
into hundreds, witj^ only nomenclatural infertility
imposing a limit.
11Ernest Nagel has delineated six usages of the term function,
12
a list to which Meehan has added a seventh possibility.
Some of these usages appear to emphasize overly fine distinc-
tions but two of them, in the realm of social science inquiry,
require clear differentiation. We refer to the use of func-
tion to imply either (a) a necessity for systemic maintenance,
or (b) the agent producing certain consequences. Following
9Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative
Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.),
The Politics of the Developing Areas , (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960).
10Dowse, World Politics , pp. 608-609.
^Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the
Logic of Scientific Explanation , (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World Inc., 1961), pp. 520-535.
12Meehan, p. 113.
13King, pp. 118-119.
8the lead of King we will adhere to the second usage, not only
because it has the analytical flexibility of allowing for
both intended and unintended consequences, but also because
this latter usage avoids the technological connotations in-
herent in viewing functions as indispensable components of
the system chosen for study.
The Study of Political Parties
Why study political parties? The most obvious answer to
this question is: Because parties exist! The modern world
contains social entities to which conventional wisdom assigns
the label of political party and with the positive value which
is commonly attached to the concept "democratic," parties are
regarded as a vehicle by which this desired condition can be
realized. With certain ideological differences to be discussed
below, this state of affairs is as valid for one-party as for
two- and multi-party politics. If it is the task of the stu-
dent of government and politics to describe and explain pol-
itical realities, then such a widespread phenomenon cannot be
ignored. Some contemporary scholars are prone to list specific
reasons why the study of parties should be continued and ex-
panded. Some appear to suggest that one of the primary jus-
tifications for studying parties is because of the rise of a
competing ideology to democracy as we know it in the West
an ideology which until very recently has been regarded as
generating a one-party monolith. 14 Such a justification is
suggested by both Neumann 15 and Nei-l A. McDonald16 as one of .
the primary reasons for the study of parties. Neumann addi-
tionally justifies his work by claiming that "political
17parties are the lifeline of modern politics," and that
18
"Political Parties are the main agents of public affairs."
Attitudes such as these have been brought into serious ques-
1Qtion by both Anthony King and Howard A. Scarrow who suggest
that the role in government and political processes which is
commonly assigned to parties may, in fact, be exaggerated
because of scholarly assumptions rather than empirical in-
vestigation. If the wish is father to the thought, empirical
explanation cannot be delivered from a union of fervent desires
14For exceptions to these attitudes see the discussion of
the Polish "hegemonic party system" by Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Pol-
itical Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Develop-
ment in Poland, " American Political Science Review , Vol. LXIV,
No. 4, (December, 1970), pp. 1239-1245.
15Neumann, pp. 1-2, 5.
16Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties , (New
York: Random House, 1955), p. 4.
17Neumann, p. 1.
18
Ibid.
, p. 4.
19See King, Polity , and Howard A. Scarrow, "The Function
of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature and the
Approach," Journal of Politics , No. 29, (November, 1967), pp.
772-774.
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and isolated rationally. it is our contention that excess-
ively normative and/or rational studies of parties do little
to further explanation of them.
Why then should one engage in the empirical study of
political parties? If this question is adequately answered,
another is then generated: How should parties be studied?
The answer to the first question is that a social
phenomenon called parties exists and that the furtherance of
comprehension of the political aspect of human social life
requires that parties be understood—not in the normative
context of superior and inferior political ideologies and
systems, but from the point of view of value neutral under-
standing. Our position concerning party studies has no
ethical overburden. It is justified instead on the grounds
of man's apparent desire to empirically explain as much as
he can of the world around him. In striving for under-
standing of political life, parties are permanent appearing
social institutions, at least in the short run, and thus can
be considered one of the relevant variables which must be
recognized, studied, and perhaps eventually fully understood,
How then should the study of the phenomenon political
party be approached? Duverger has summarized a central
problem of the study of parties when he refers to the "basic
contradiction" inherent in a field of study which consists,
for the most part, of single polity description and analysis.
Such a narrow gauge approach does not encourage the formu-
lation and testing of general hypotheses applicable to a
cross-polity general party investigation. But, such general
questions can only be generated in a meaningful way by the
use of a theoretical framework. Thus the question then be-
comes: Why theories about political parties?"
All political communities which have reached the socially
differentiated stage of political development contain two
primary political classes, the rulers and the ruled. This
division of responsibility raises questions concerning:
. . . the fundamental roles of rulers (politicians)
,
and their recruitment and selection, the personal,
social and organizational basis of their influence,
and how their political organizations ^.ffeet the
making of important public decisions.
The political party has been called a link between the gov-
ernors and the governed:
The political party is a strategically critical
concept for understanding, in any developed political
system, the practices that permit and justify the
exercise of political authority, that regulate the
effective choice and removal of political rulers, and
20This question has been explored by Avery Leiserson in
"The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," American
Political Science Review , Vol. 51, No. 4, (December, 1957),
pp. 947-950.
21Ibid.
, p. 947.
that prescribe and delimit the authority of the
government in power; as well as the processes by
which public policy-makers are guided by and sub-
ject to the broad movements of popular sentiment
and the balance of inter-group pressures.
^
There is a wealth of data available which describes the
characteristics of individual parties and party systems. A
theoretical approach to the study of parties can describe
interrelationships among parties and organize and clarify the
available information in order to increase comprehension and
possibly predictability.
Political Groups in Society
Entities referred to as political groups are a part of
all differentiated societies. Decision makers, and groups
seeking to influence, control, and often displace them, have
existed since the beginning of recorded history. Observation
of, comment upon, and analysis of the processes whereby pol-
itical power is attained, influenced and controlled, has
23
continued for at least the past 2,500 years.
Until almost the present century, the study of political
groups in society has consisted of a stated or implied
22
Ibid.
,
p. 948.
23The Politics of Aristotle is an example of such obser-
vation and analysis. See especially Book V, trans, by
Ernest
Baker, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).
13
measurement of the observed actuality against a highly norm-
ative ideal type of political organization. Observers often
posited a particular end for man in political society to
attain. Groups and/or group systems would then be discussed
in terms of how they contributed to the attainment of a par-
ticular polity, or how they fell short of the posited ideal. 24
Following the development of a specific phenomenon referred
to as party, analytical studies of these entities began to
appear
.
Analytical Party Studies
The first steps in the direction of an analytical ap-
proach to the cross-polity study of parties was the turn-of-
the-century work of Roberto Michels^ and Michael Ostrogorski.
One scholar states that prior to the attempt of Maurice
nA
For example, many Medieval philosophers strongly crit-
icized any group in society seen as circumscribing the func-
tioning of the Church in many, if not all aspects of civil
society.
25
Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study
of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy , trans, by
Eden and Cedar Paul, (New York: The Free Press, 1966; origin-
ally published 1915)
.
26Michael Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of
Political Parties , edited and abridged by Seymour Martin
Lipset, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964;
first published 1902)
.
14
Duverger to construct a general theory of political parties
in the early 1950 's, "... only Ostrogorski and Michels had
written analytical stasiology
.
1,27 This is an overstatement
unless it is not intended to refer to the analytical study
of parties and party systems in specific polities such as the
work of V. 0. Key and Elmer E. Schattschneider in the United
States, or G. D. H. Cole and R. T. McKenzie in Britain. These
scholars are representative of observers who looked behind and
beyond the formal and legal structure of governments to seek
answers to such questions as: How does government really
operate? Their inquiries were not of a broad and inclusive
scope to the degree that they might be called general party
theorists but they, and many others in the past fifty years,
have amassed a vast body of empirical data concerning specific
parties and party systems, leading one observer to note that
there is "an embarrassment of riches" which awaits the general
28
party theorist.
Both Michels and Ostrogorski directed their attention
toward a comparison of formal and actual power structures of the
27
Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings
on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics , Vol. 19, No. 3,
(1957)
, pp. 423-440.
28McDonald, p. 3.
15
democratic aspect of parties and found a wide divergence be-
tween democratic theory and actual practice. One current
observer has stated that both of these analysts attempted to
move from the particular to the general by examination of
specific systems, and from this examination to move in the
direction of general laws or generalizations. 29 This approach
was confined to few parties and party systems and only to
those of an alleged democratic leaning.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the only cross-
polity general theoretical frameworks developed were what will
here be called the "mandate" theory and the Marxian theory of
parties
.
Nearly half a century later, Maurice Duverger, in his
30groundbreaking work, sought to enlarge the scope of the
analytical study of parties by inclusion of both democratic
and authoritarian parties within the same explanatory frame-
work .
Our field of interest in this essay is in furthering the
efforts to develop a general empirical party theory and we
will suggest a framework of analysis with which the mandate,
Marxian and Duverger contributions to such a theory can be
assessed.
29Englemann, The Journal of Politics .
30Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and
Activity in the Modern State.
16
An Analytical Framework of Critique
In order to effectively judge the contribution made to
the understanding of the phenomenon political party by existing
theoretical constructs, it is necessary to devise an analytical
framework. This tool of analysis will then allow us to assess
the value of these offerings to determine their validity as
general empirical theories of parties.
The criteria used as a standard of judgment in this
essay are: (1) the orientation or type of theory— Is its
foundation primarily normative or empirical? (2) the inclu-
siveness of specific manifestations of the relevant phenomenon
to be explained, (3) the range, scope, or reach of the proposed
theory: Is it of narrow or middle range, or a general theory?
(4) the level of abstraction at which the entity called party,
by the theorist, is conceptualized. Is the theorist's con-
ceptualization of party one step removed from the empirical
reality--the human actor—or is it a distance of two con-
ceptual steps in that party is being conceived of as a pat-
terned complex of human actions or behaviors? These four
criteria are presented as valid means of evaluation to deter-
mine the utility of party theories as general tools of ex-
planation.
17
Orientation or Theory Type
Our first standard of theory evaluation is the deter-
mination as to whether the emphasis of the theory is based
upon a foundation of normative value judgments or empirical
facts. This is not to suggest that it is possible to conduct
political or any other research which is value-free. The
very choice of phenomena to be explained is in itself a value
judgment. But the influence of a value foundation:
. . .
does not mean, however, that the validity of
empirical research depends upon the kind of values
with which one approaches his data; validity still
is determined by the correspondence of a statement
to reality. 3
Normative (ethical or moral) and empirical (descriptive,
behavioral or operational) theories rest upon fundamentally
different bases. The former is based upon propositions which
express "... the emotional response of an individual to a
32
state of real or presumed facts." Such propositions usually
contain elements of both value and fact. The factual portion
can be tested as to its validity—the value portion cannot be
so tested. "It indicates whether, and the extent to which,
3
an individual desires a particular state of affairs to exist."
3l
David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the
State of Political Science , (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959),
pp. 225-226.
32
lb id
.
, p. 221.
33 Ibid.
18
Empirical constructs have as their basis only real
facts. We are continuously confronted with an uncountable
number of empirical facts— facts which are, or have been,
observed to exist as descriptions of properties which are
ascribed to realities. "it is by experience alone that in-
formation about the world is received. 1,34 Thus an empirical
fact is independent of all other knowledge. It is a "claim
to knowledge which is independent of, and not a derivative
35from, existing knowledge." Political parties exist as
viable entities and vital components of the political systems
of most of the world. To attempt to explain their factual
existence, structure and function, in other than a frame of
reference which fully recognized the empirical aspect would
appear to this observer to be moving away from reality.
Theory Indus iveness
If a theory is to be a valid general tool of explanation
with reference to a particular phenomenon (in this instance
political parties), then the theory must be broad enough to
include all those entities which should be included in the
34Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry , (San Francisco:
The Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 4.
Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political
Analysis
,
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 38.
19
nomenclature which has been chosen to establish the charact-
eristics and the boundaries of the phenomenon under inves-
tigation. If the specific manifestations of the phenomenon
which are perceived by the investigator to exhaust the rele-
vant class of observables do not in fact do so, then the
utility of the theory as a general explanatory construct is
open to serious question. This is especially true if the
excluded but relevant manifestations are later demonstrated
to exhibit characteristics which are at variance with the
basic assumptions which the observer made in the formulation
of his theory. Thus inclusiveness of all relevant occurrences
of the phenomenon is a necessary attribute of a valid general
theory.
Theory Range
This proposed yardstick to measure the effectiveness of
theory as an explanatory device is concerned with the level
of explanation. If theory in the broad sense can be defined
as "any kind of generalization or proposition that asserts
that two or more things, activities or events covary under
3 6
specified conditions," then the theories which the general-
izations make possible can be classified as narrow, middle-
36David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life ,
(New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. 7.
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range, or broad (general) theories, depending upon the level
of explanation which each of these types of theory provides.
A theory that is narrow in scope, according to Easton,
is one which is a statement "of observed uniformity between
two isolated and easily identified variables." 37 From such,
a construct few generalizations are possible because of the
limited number of variables present in this type of con-
ceptual explanation. Such hypotheses are relatively easy to
verify empirically. When taken alone they do not lend them-
selves to extension to theories of a higher level. This is
the task of middle-range theories such as Michels ' "Iron Law
of Oligarchy." This type of theory allows the observer to
transcend the limits of his observations—to generalize as
did Michels about all groups in society which are formed for
specific ends. Michels did not feel it necessary to confine
himself to his own verification of direct observation. Middle-
range theories are based upon a number of singular general-
izations which are then brought together within a conceptual
framework.
The third level of theory is that of broad general the-
ories—conceptual frameworks in which are located the tools
37Easton, The Political System . The above evaluation and
classification of theories follows Easton' s, pp. 55-59.
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Of explanation for either all of the phenomena which are seen
as the province of a particular academic discipline, or one
of the primary components of a discipline such as political
parties within the study of government and politics. With
regard to parties, such a general empirical theory would be
cognizant of party origin, structure, and function, 38 as it
seeks to explain the concept political party.
Level of Theory Conceptualization
The goal of this essay is to contribute to an eventual
empirical theory of political parties. We have suggested that
party is an empirical entity which can be perceived, analyzed
and eventually explained within a general theoretical frame-
work. Any theoretical explanation is only as strong as the
explanatory power of the concepts which the theory employs.
If is often held that the maturity of science
is reflected in the status of its theory. Given
the fact that theoretical development is contingent
upon conceptual definition, the significance of
38At least one observer, Neil A. McDonald in The Study of
Political Parties
,
suggests that in addition to these aspects,
the legal status and the "object," the entity upon which the
party acts, are also "theoretical approaches" to the study of
party. He has not convinced this observer that these two
aspects of the study of parties are necessary components of a
general empirical theory of parties since no two legal systems
are alike and all are normatively based and ideographic.
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conceptual definition is obvious for the growth of
the behavioral sciences. 39
Thus, any suggested theoretical explanation should be scru-
tinized as to the nature of the conceptualizations which it
employs
.
Concepts are not in themselves empirical but rather the^
are the individual observer's imposition of intellectual
order upon the raw sense data to which the researcher's
40
attention is directed. They imply a value judgment on the
part of the observer and a trained observer has an increased
chance of peer acceptability of concepts which he employs.
However, the act of peer acceptability of concepts within a
theoretical framework suggests the emphasis upon specific
values
.
Concepts specify the form and content of the variables
which one's general sociological orientation defines
as important.
Gordon J. Direnzo, "Conceptual Definition in the Behav-
ioral Sciences," in Gordon J. Direnzo, ed., Concepts, Theory
and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences
,
(New York: Random
House Inc., 1966), p. 16.
40
See, for example, Arthur S. Goldberg, "Political Science
as Science," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul
A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life: An Introducion to
Political Behavior
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963),
pp. 26-35.
41Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction to the
Discipline and Profession
,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice
Hall Inc. , 1964) , p. 100.
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This orientation is a result of choice on the part of the
observer and as such is an expression of a value preference.
It is therefore impossible to totally divorce fact from value
in explanation. Thus, a wholly acceptable explanation of a
social science phenomenon is a function of its expression of
widely held peer values within a historical context. 42 We
will thus assess the three general explanations of parties
from the perspective of the contemporary values of society
which they express or imply.
Another question with regard to conceptualizations is
the basic unit chosen as the dependent variable for which the
theory is intended to provide an explanation. If the theory
is an attempt to explain the phenomenon political party;
Is party shown by the definition used by the observer, a low
43level, intermediate or a high level abstraction? As King
has demonstrated, the level of conceptual abstraction utilized
by the theorist has important implications for the nature of
the questions which the theory is designed to provide answers.
If party is conceived as a cluster of human actors, then the
explanatory emphasis of the theoretical construct is focused
upon party ideology, structure and organizations. If party
49
See Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgment and Social Science
Structures and Processes , (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey
Press, 1969), especially Chapters II and III.
4
^King, pp. 113-116.
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is conceived as patterned human interactions, then the em-
phasis of the explanation shifts to a stressing of the:
.
.
.
consequences of parties and party systems—
their existence, structure and behavior—for pol-
itical systems as a whole.
If parties are a central component of modern government
and politics, we would expect that valid general explanations
would conceptualize parties in the second sense, as patterned
interactions
.
We shall analyze the three explanations of party to
determine both which dominant values, if any, they express and
also the level of abstraction at which the phenomenon pol-
itical party is conceptualized.
Summary
We have presented four analytical standards with which
to determine the validity of an explanatory construct as a
general empirical theory of parties. If the proposed ex-
planation fails to meet the tests of orientation, of inclu-
siveness, of range, or of conceptualization, then its claim
to the status of a general empirical theory is invalid even
though it may qualify under one or two of our posited stan-
dards of validity.
44
Ibid.
, p. 115. See also Scarrow, Journal of Politics
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Up to the present time, three explanations of the phen-
omenon called political party have been developed which have
some degree of legitimacy in their claim to be called general
theories of parties. Chapter II will briefly sketch the
essentials of two of these contructs
. Chapter III will deal
in a similar manner with the Duverger approach to general
party theory, as far as our analytical framework of theory
range, scope, base and conceptualization allows. Chapter IV
will spell out some of the major difficulties inherent in
the subject matter with regard to theory construction in the
Social Sciences, and Chapter V will provide a definition of
party and additional discussion concerning the conceptualization
of this phenomenon. Chapter VI will suggest some variables of
a heuristic model as the path along which fruitful work toward
a general empirical theory of political parties might proceed.
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THE MANDATE
-RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND MARXIAN-
COMMUNIST
-MAO 1ST EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Prior to the "preliminary general theory of parties"
suggested by Maurice Duverger, the two most inclusive ex-
planations of parties were the Marxian-Communist, and the
mandate-responsible government theories. The mandate theory
of parties was implied in the works of Woodrow Wilson, Henry
Jones Ford and Frank Goodnow, 1 and refined by Joseph
2 3Schumpeter and Elmer Schattschneider
. It continues to
exercise considerable influence in the study of some aspects
of government. The Marxian-Leninist-Maoist or communist
theoretical concept of party also enjoys extensive utilization
as a method of organization of the data concerning political
parties and as a tool of explanation.
The mandate or responsible government concept was devel-
oped by Wilson in Congressional Government
,
(Cleveland, Ohio:
World Publishing Co., 1964; originally published in 1885) and
in his Constitutional Government in the United States
,
(New
York: Columbia University Press, 1908).
Henry Jones Ford's most explicit formulation of this ex-
planation of the functioning of parties in mass democracy was
his The Rise and Growth of American Politics
,
(New York: Mac-
millan Company, 1898) . The contribution of Frank J. Goodnow
to the model is primarily developed in his Politics and Admin-
istration
,
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900)
.
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ,
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 2nd ed., 1947), see Chapters
XXI and XXII.
o »•»•*
Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People , (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), and Party Government,
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942).
27
The Mandate-Responsible Government Explanation of Party
This explanation of political parties has, for the past
one hundred years, continued to attract a great deal of sup-
port both from the general public and from students of gov-
ernment and politics. It has been referred to both as the
"responsible government" explanation and also as the "mandate"
theory of parties. Some observers have used these labels
interchangeably but the tendency has been to apply the label
"responsible" because of its implication of wider applicability
to specific manifestations of the phenomenon party than the
"mandate" designation has been felt to suggest.^
Political commentators have continued for centuries to
differ as to the essence of the concept democracy but a measure
of agreement is evident to the extent that democracy implies
some degree of ruler control by the ruled. It is our con-
tention that the use of the words "mandate" and "responsible"
imply a subtle but important shift in emphasis concerning the
See, for example, Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller,
"Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion
Quarterly
,
Vol. 26 (Winter, 1962), pp. 531-546. "The notion
of responsibility generally is understood to mean that the
parties play a mediating role between the public and its gov-
ernment, making popular control effective by developing rival
programs of government action that are presented to the elec-
torate for its choice. The party whose program gains the
greater support takes possession of the government and is held
responsible to the public in later elections for its success
in giving its program effect." p. 532.
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relationship between rulers and ruled with respect to the
roles which these two societal elements are assigned in the
democratic party explanations of the political aspects of
society.
Most students of parties agree that party is the instit-
utional link between popular desires and governmental pol-
•
. 5lcies. The early observers of the phenomenon political
party, no doubt heavily influenced by assumptions of the
rationality and desire to participate in his own governance
on the part of the ruled, held that parties operating within
an electoral choice context were bound and constrained to
engage only in courses of action whose purpose was to effect
their pre-election promises. These parties, in this early
view, were committed to narrow and specific programs, devia-
tion from which was sufficient justification for mass public
adverse reaction. The reaction could vary from loss of elec-
toral support, to popular revolution. 6 This narrow view of
the scope of allowable party activity was a result of the
classical liberal position as to the proper role of government
in the affairs of the ruled.
Most authors of basic texts, as well as some more ad-
vanced and specialized commentators share this view. See, for
example Footnote #4, above.
John Locke and Thomas Jefferson are examples of demo-
cratic theorists who defended popular revolution as a check
upon those rulers who appeared to ignore the direct linkage
between the popular will and governmental policy outputs.
Both of these words continue to be used in a highly norm-
ative context but it is our contention that the label "mandate"
is the more normative of the two since it has been applied to
a state or condition of political affairs which could only
exist in a theoretical sense. Since man has not, and will not
exist in a world of perfect information, it is not reasonable
to expect that in any existing or anticipated representative
form of government, the rulers can have no flexibility what-
soever to exercise even a minimum degree of individual ini-
tiative. The totally instructed delegate representative is a
Utopian figment of the imagination of such political philoso-
phers as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau.
The concept "responsible parties" suggests that there is
a degree of direct connection between electorate desires and
official public policy outputs but that this connection does
not restrict the choice of policy alternatives of rulers to
nearly the same degree as does the mandate designation. Thus,
on a continuum of extent of governed control of the governors,
Wilson, Ford and Goodnow appear to fall within the middle
range of the mandated party responsible party, scale.
Schumpeter and Schattschneider are much closer to the respon-
sible party end of the continuum.
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The Party Responsibility Explanation of Political Party
This explanation of parties was initially developed by
three Americans around the turn of the century, Wilson, Ford
7
and Goodnow. It has enjoyed continued use as an explanatory
framework for the phenomenon party; has been utilized by some
democratic theorists to "explain" some parties and party
systems, and has been justified by others as "the conduit or
sluice by which the waters of political machinery and set to
gturn those wheels." The mid-century work of a committee of
the foremost professional association of American Political
9Science attests to its durability.
The model evolved as a result of the inquiries of these
men into such basic questions as the resolution of the con-
flict between majority rule and minority rights. They util-
ized a theoretical approach to the study of the American party
7As discussed by Austin Ranney in The Doctrine of Res-
ponsible Party Government
,
(Urbana, Illinois: The University
of Illinois Press, 1962). Chapter 6, the mandating or party
responsibility of Frank Goodnow was a party leader-member
relationship but like both Wilson and Ford, he was not at all
explicit in his definition of party membership.
8Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government , (London:
Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 39.
9
"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American
Political Science Review, XLIV Supplement (September, 1950)
.
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phenomenon and in so doing asked themselves the questions:
What is the essential nature of democracy? How can democracy
realistically be operated within the legal limitations of the
United States form of government? They looked beyond the
formal legal constructs and discovered the alleged necessity
of political parties. Parties V7ere then defended as the most
effective, if not the only practical way, to unite formal
government and the majority desires while preserving a sub-
stantial segment of minority rights.
The reconciliation of majority rule with minority rights,
a continuing dilemma for democratic theorists, was solved to
the satisfaction of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow by means of the
doctrine of responsible parties. Such parties would ensure
a collective responsibility to the electorate on the part of
the governing members of the party. These authors implied
that collective (party) responsibility such as they thought
they saw in Great Britain, insured that at least vocal and
influential constituencies would be heeded by the party seeking
electoral support. Because the apex of political power was
dependent upon a successful search for support, the rights of
minorities would be recognized in the party attempts to forge
a winning coalition of popular votes. To these three ob-
servers of the American political scene, the lack of party
responsibility was an open invitation to the possible supression
of the rights of minorities since neither the Democratic nor
Republican parties had either election platforms or programs
to which elective office-seeking party members were bound to
adhere after their successful contest for office. 10
The responsible government explanation of American
parties was a result of the efforts of Wilson and his con-
temporaries to chart a path for the United States to move
toward a more democratic form of government. They called for
parties which would be responsible to the electorate. They
thought that the way to accomplish this desired goal was for
the party which was successful in attaining office to regard
itself as having a commitment to put into effect the campaign
promises by means of which it had successfully sought elec-
toral support from the voters.
A. Lawrence Lowell, a contemporary student of American
parties of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow, made similar observations
of the United States ' party system—but in the tradition of
James Madison, John C. Calhoun and John Fischer, among others,
Lowell alleged that Americans wished to stress minority rights,
if necessary at the expense of majority rule. Thus Lowell
argued that the doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks
and Balances—both as written by the Founding Fathers and as
defended by the public--were an integral part of, and an ex-
pression of, the peculiarly American theory and practice of
government. See Lowell's Public Opinion and Popular Government
,
(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1913), John C. Calhoun,
A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse
,
(Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merr ill Co., Inc., 1953; ori-
ginally published in 1853) , and John Fischer, "Government by
Concurrent Majority, " in Bishop and Hendel, Basic Issues of
American Democracy , 6th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1970), pp. 432-442.
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These observers compared the British and American func-
tions of parties and thought that they saw in Great Britain
a system of responsible party government at work. The later
studies of some scholars such as Lewis Namier suggest that
the mandate concept was similar to the Montesquieu description
of a separation of powers in the English governmental system,
that neither construct in fact existed when it was observed
to exist by those scholars who thought they were engaged in
describing an observed reality. 11
The mandate explanation assumes that there is an aware
electorate and that its political preferences exist and are
not created. In addition, while party positions may be the
same on some issues, on others a clear alternative course of
action is presented to the voter. The party which is suc-
cessful in attaining office by virtue of winning a plurality
of the seats, because of an acceptance by many voters of the
party's campaign promises as being desirable courses of action
for government to engage in, has a covenant or mandate to
enact its campaign pledges into law.
The mandate construct was attractive as a means of ex-
planation because of the positive connotations of the word
"responsible" in the fulfilling of campaign promises. This
concept thus provided an excellent standard of measurement
xxThe Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III
,
(London: The Macmillan Company, 1959).
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with which to gauge the behavior of politicians. Perhaps its
most powerful appeal is that it brought under one explanatory
umbrella the actions of voters and prospective office holders,
the transformation of majority desires into legislation, and
the ultimate dependence of those in power upon the electorate.
Those holding a minority position on a question of public
policy were allowed an institutionalized means to strive to
become a majority and thus to have their wishes enacted into
law. In addition, as outlined above, the rights of minorities
were felt to be protected through the "invisible hand" of
disciplined and responsible party competition for elective
office by means of coalition building.
In this explanation of the functioning of parties within
a framework of democratic government, the wishes of the people
were deemed more important than the selection of leaders or
representatives to carry out those wishes. The explanation
was primarily backward-directed in that the chosen leaders
were held to be obligated, because of their electoral mandate,
12to enact into law their campaign promises made to the people.
Joseph Schumpeter critized the position of Wilson, Ford
and Goodnow that program enactment was more important than
leadership selection. This criticism was based upon:
12Class notes: Political Science 361, Political Parties
,
Professor Roger Marz, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.
Summer, 1966.
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the proposition that "the people" hold a def-inite and rational opinion about every individual
question and that they give effect to their opinionm a democracy by chosing "representatives" who
will see to it that opinion is carried out. 13
Schumpeter suggested that the emphasis upon the two elements
of democracy, the deciding of political issues by the elec-
torate and the selection of leaders, be reversed so that the
element of leadership selection by primarily emphasized. This
explanation for representative democracy then becomes forward
directed in that the elected are now primarily concerned with
remaining in office and will trim their political sails with
this end in view. 14 Their mandate has shifted from a ful-
fillment of past election promises to the personal one of
occupational self-preservation. Schattschneider suggests much
the same approach when he defines democracy as:
... a competitive political system in which competing
leaders and organizations define the alternatives of
public policy in such a way that the public can par-
ticipate in the decision-making process. 15
The essence of the mandate explanation of parties is that
it is the only practical way in which to reconcile majority
desires and minority rights within a framework of government
13Schumpeter, p. 269.
14An excellent theoretical exploration of the implications
of this support maximization is Anthony Downs ' An Economic
Theory of Democracy
,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
15Elmer E. Schattschneider, p. 141.
referred to as representative democracy. The primary func-
tion of party is that of peaceful reconciliation of divergent
views within a framework of choice of leadership.
The Marxian Explanation of Political Party
Karl Marx was primarily engaged in producing a general
theory of human history—a theory with political, economic,
sociological and historical validity and one which was based
upon what were alleged to be scientific or empirical laws of
human existence. According to his analysis of man in society,
the establishment of a particular type of social organization
is inevitable when certain conditions relating to the organ-
ization and evolution of the means of production and distrib-
ution of material goods have developed. As one expert stated:
It would not be an exaggeration to say that
virtually all of Marxism is directed toward demon-
strating this inevitability in a rigorously "scien-
tific" manner, toward proving beyond any doubt that
social justice must come.
The economic foundations upon which industrial society
is constructed are subject to recurrent distributive crises
which increase the ranks of, and solidify, the workers be-
hind their leaders. These leaders are defected intellectuals
of bourgeois origin who are able to foresee the inevitable
16Arthur P. Mendel, ed., Essential Works of Marxism ,
(New York: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 3.
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collapse of the capitalist society. The function of the
Communist Party members in this unfolding of the historical
process is stated by Marx and Engels in the Communist Mani-
festo :
The Communists therefore, are on the one hand,
in the sphere of practice, the most advanced and
resolute section of the working-class parties of
every country, that section which pushes forward all
others; and on the other hand, in the sphere of
theory, they have over the great mass of the pro-
letariat the advantage of clearly understanding the
line of march, the conditions and the ultimate gen-
eral results of the proletarian movement. 17
Thus, to Marx and Engels, party as the activist core of
class is the means by which the masses are able to take full
advantage of a situation, the full development of which is
held to be inevitable. This view of the function of party
has been consistently held, as demonstrated by the 1961
statement in The New Program of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union , that "The supreme goal of the party is to build
18
a Communist society.
"
Lenin's Theory of Party
Marx and Engels were not activist revolutionaries in the
sense that Lenin was to become and their explanations of the
17
Lewis S. Fe.uer, ed. , Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on
Politics and Philosophy
,
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books,
Doubleday and Company, 195 9) , p. 20.
Mendel, p. 373.
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origins, organization and function of political parties was
modified by Lenin who, while excelling in both spheres of
activity, was an organizer and a conspirator first, and a
theoretician second. Lenin was always able to justify his
chosen courses of action by reference to Marx and Engels but
his participation in concrete human events in an industrially
backward nation, necessitated many deviations from what con-
temporary Marxist scholars often regarded as orthodoxy. One
of his most obvious deviations from Marx was in the area of
party organization, and to a lesser extent, party function. 19
As will be described below, the Chinese Communist Party under
the theory and application of Mao Tse-tung has also differed
from the intellectual party theory of Marx. Both the Russian
and the Chinese leaders found it necessary to deviate from
Marxian orthodoxy because of the prime consideration of at-
90tracting support for their revolutionary activities in an
industrially underdeveloped nation-state which had little in
the way of a manifest—or even latent
—
proletariat. In ad-
dition, both Lenin and Mao, as active revolutionaries, found
19Our reference here is to party function in the pre-
socialist revolutionary stage and not after the party has
assumed control of a substantial portion of the polity.
20 ...
Or, especially in the case of Lenin, a minimum of
passive acquiescence on the part of the bulk of the indigenous
peasant population.
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that the spontaneity and inevitability of the Marxian ex-
planation of party origins were of too extended a time frame
for them to accomplish the overthrow of existing social sys-
tems and the establishment of at least a socialist, if not a
full communist polity, within their lifetimes.
Marx had believed that the party would arise and develop
as a natural result of increased tensions between the two
great social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The membership of the party was to coalesce around the magnet
of Marx's explanation of the gradual unfolding of social
development and would consist of the most astute and aware
21
members of the proletariat class. This political party
would also include: "
. . .a portion of the bourgeois ideol-
ogists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending
• 2 ?theoretically the historical movement as a whole." These
recruits, presumably because of their capacity to think anal-
ytically or dialectically, would then "supply the proletariat
23
with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress. Marx
21A frequently quoted statement of Marx is one to the
effect that: "The emancipation of the working class is the
work of the working class itself." Quoted in George H. Sabine,
A History of Political Theory
, 3rd ed., (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 813.
22Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto
,
(Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1954), p. 34.
23
Ibid.
, p. 33.
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provides no explanation as to how one is to reconcile this
alleged enlightenment on the part of some elements of the
bourgeoisie with his views concerning the class basis of all
bourgeoisie knowledge as part of the superstructure of
society. A possible reconciliation is that the enlightenment
is of a methodological rather than an epistemological nature.
In the realm of party organization, the Marxist party,
though revolutionary, is not clandestine. Because of his
belief in class antagonisms as the motive force of history,
Marx apparently felt that no detailed description of the
necessary modes of specific party organization was necessary
as long as the existing revolutionary organization believed
fully in the function which was its place in Marxian history
to perform.
The primary function of the Marxian party was to nurture
and develop a sense of class consciousness within the ranks
of the proletariat so that this great class would thus be
ready, willing and able to act on a united basis when the laws
of history dictated that the second, or socialist revolution,
24
was at hand.
24Marx's ideas of historical evolution to the stage of
socialist revolution in countries without a large proletariat
were primarily outlined in his "Marginal Notes to the Program
of the German Worker's Party, 1875 (Critique of the Gotha
Program) published by Engels in 1891 and discussed in Sabine,
pp. 801-803. His central idea of "the revolution in permanence"
was later utilized by Trotsky and Lenin as being well adapted
to the Russian situation of 1905-1917.
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In his analysis of the prerequisites and conditions by
which a successful revolution could be accomplished in Russia,
Lenin believed that there must be created a revolutionary
vanguard organized as a political party. This party was to
demand strict and unquestioned obedience and loyalty to the
decisions of the leadership, once such decisions had been
made. The party would be comprised of a:
.
. .
small compact core, consisting of reliable and
experienced hardened workers, with responsible agents
in the principal districts and connected by all the
rules of strict secrecy with the organization of
revolutionists.
. .
This "vanguard" party was seen by Lenin as:
... an intelligent and instructed elite, essen-
tially powerless in itself but capable of infinite
power if only it can harness the enormous drive of
social mass discontent and mass action. 6
Thus, with minor modifications, the theoretical explan-
ation of the origins of the Party are the same for both Marx
and Lenin. The structures as outlined by both are also
similar in their surface manifestations to the extent that
the party membership was to be drawn from the same social
class—the "aware" bourgeoisie and "conscious" proletariat.
But Lenin, as the maker of a successful revolution in an
25
V. I. Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. TV, Book II, (New
York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 194.
2 6Sabine, p. 816.
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industrially backward polity, was faced with the problem of
a dearth of potential revolutionaries. Instead, he had
masses of peasants. The pragmatic necessity of staffing his
movement with dedicated and yet pragmatic revolutionary
Marxists forced him to modify both the structure and the
functions of the party as these concepts had been developed
27by Karl Marx.
On the theoretical level, Lenin met this problem by
reference to, and almost exclusive emphasis upon, a single
phrase in the Manifesto :
. . .
bourgeois ideologists who have raised them-
selves to the level of comprehending the historical
movement as a whole.
Such people were to be the Party of Lenin. They would lead
the "aware" elements of the insignificant Russian proletariat
to, and through the socialist revolution and on to the
promised land of a communist society. The proletariat and
and elements of the Russian peasant class were the revolu-
tionary army with the party members to serve as the officer
corps. Lenin justified the exclusion of enlightened elements
27
His staffing problems were further exacerbated by the
contending schools of Marxian interpretation exemplified in
Russia by the Bolshevicks and Mensheviks, and in Western
Europe by the Utopian (trade unionist or evolutionist) and
the "scientific" or revolutionist interpretations of what
Marx "really meant."
28Marx, p. 34.
43
of the proletariat from party influence because he argued
that the:
. . .
proletariat clearly needed to be managed and
maneuvered by leaders who are not proletarians but
who know what the proletariat ought to want though
in fact they rarely do want it. 29
Lenin argued that left to themselves, without the yeast of a
fully conscious cadre of activist party workers and leaders,
the proletariat would develop a "trade union" or evolutionary
consciousness but not a revolutionary fervor sufficient to
accomplish a successful socialist revolution. He was deter-
mined not to see a Russian worker's movement develop along
the lines of what he felt was the compromised Social Demo-
cratic Party in Germany. The "spontaneity" of worker and
peasant social discontent was to be harnessed, channeled and
controlled by the consciousness of the Party members, men
who one observer has called that:
. . . intelligent and instructed elite, essentially
powerless in itself but capable of infinite power
if only it can harness the enormous drive of social
mass discontent and mass action.
Thus, the structure of the Party under the guidance of
the activist theoretician Lenin was modified when applied to
a concrete historical situation. The membership strata of
29Sabine, p. 815.
3Q
rbid.
, p. 816.
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Marx was changed both quantitatively and qualitatively and
the most basic function of the party now became the instit-
utionalization of consciousness of party members and the
control and direction of lower class spontaneity. Both were
accomplished in Soviet Russia by means of the administrative
decision-making principle of "democratic centralism."
Mao Tse-tung and Communist Party Theory
Karl Marx was a theoretician without peer in the realm
of the generation of dynamic and general explanations of
social man. Lenin possessed a high degree of competence in
both theorizing and in actively promoting and accomplishing
a class based social revolution. Mao Tse-tung' s strengths
are less in the field of theory than in the practice of
abrupt social change but his ex post facto modifications of
Marxian and Leninist party theory have become for many a
central component of Communist Party theory. Thus, his ac-
ceptance of and deviations from both Marx and Lenin in the
areas of party origins, structure and function warrant con-
sideration.
Mao, as Lenin before him, was faced with the problem of
fomenting and bringing about a socialist upheaval in a polity
which lacked a numerically large industrial proletariat. In
China this class was almost totally nonexistent. Lenin had
45
justified his utilization of the small and weak Russian pro-
letariat class plus a very few enlightened Russian peasants,
led by the "vanguard party," by reference to one rather ob-
31
scure phrase in the Manifesto
. Mao accepted this Leninist
interpretation of the origins and membership of the party
rather than the Marxian explanation which leaned heavily upon
staffing the organization with enlightened and alienated
proletarians who had developed a high degree of militant
class consciousness. The party of Lenin and Mao was almost
wholly a vanguard of dedicated former bourgeoisie. One ob-
server has stated:
. . . Mao's Chinese Communist Party was never a class
party of the peasants; it is a totalitarian cadre
party which during the civil war relied primarily on
peasant support, but as a ruling party has long since
proved its ability to manipulate and if necessary,
oppress the peasants no less effectively than it
manipulates and oppresses China's other social
classes .
^
2
The basic structure of the Communist Party was similar
in the thinking of both Mao and Lenin. They both realized
that a high degree of discipline and dedication on the part
of party members was necessary for the success of the revol-
ution and that acceleration of the inevitable class conflict
dialectic of Marx made necessary a clandestine organization
31
Marx, p. 34.
Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration
of a Secular Faith , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966),
p. 110.
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so as to avoid persecution at the hands of agents of the
bourgeoisie
.
The most pronounced digression in Maoist party theory,
both from Marx and from Lenin, is in the primary function
which the party is to perform. For Marx the party primarily
exists to educate the proletariat to an awareness of the
inevitable class struggle, peaceful or violent. For Lenin
the most important party consideration is the realization of
a Communist society as this concept is understood by party
theoreticians who are also expert practical politicians so
as to ensure that mass spontaneity is subject to party-
interpreted consciousness.
Mao Tse-tung has gradually substituted the elitist inter-
pretations of party function of Marx and Lenin with a populist
explanation as to the proper role of the party in a communist
society. The vehicle for this transformation has been his
idea of the "mass line, " and the proper relationship of the
party to this concept. Mao's utilization of this idea as the
source of party inspiration has given rise to his most obvious
divergence from Lenin who stressed the consciousness of party
regulars as a check upon mass spontaneity. To Mao, the party
must at all times trim its sails in recognition of what the
people desire.
47
The mass line is the basic line of the Party
and this line must be followed at all times, by alldepartments, and for all types of work. During theperiod of the revolutionary wars, the Party in allits work used the method of integrating the efforts
of the leadership and the masses. 33
In assessment of the central importance of the mass line in
party policy formation, one observer has stated:
No method of operation is more characteristic
of the Maoist era of Chinese Communist Party history
than the "mass line" according to which the Party
derives its policies from the ideas of the people
themselves and then leads the people on the basis of
these policies.
. .
The greatest guarantee of even-
tual success in any enterprise is believed to be the
support of the masses, and the day-to-day modus
operandi for every type of chore is: "Learn from
the masses, unite with the masses.
. #
" 34
It was the contention of Karl Marx that he had stood
Hegel on his head in that he had removed Hegel's dialectical
methodology from the realm of epistemology and had demonstrated
to his own satisfaction that the dialectic was the driving
force in the historical evolution of social man. Now, through
his concept of the "mass line" and its relationship to the
Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung has righted Hegel again
by maintaining that the primary function of the party is to
33Peoples Daily (Peking), February 11, 1963.
34
Chalmers Johnson, "Building a. Communist Nation in China,"
The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achieve-
ments
, Robert A. Scalapino, ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 52.
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discover and follow the wishes of the people. 35
The communist theories of political party as developed
by Marx, Lenin and Mao are thus similar in their explanations
of the origins of parties. Both Lenin and Mao agree as to
the structure of the party and their primary divergence from
Marx is that, as practical revolutionaries, they saw the
necessity of secret organization as a means of protection
until the successful socialist revolution has been accomplished
In the area of party theory, Mao differs from both Marx and
Lenin when he argues that the primary function of the party
is not to lead the masses along the inevitable one true path
to Communism as discovered and promulgated by party theore-
ticians, but rather to act as the agent of the masses in
articulation of their inherent capacity to eventually, by
trial and error, develop and operate a communist polity. In
non-communist polities all three observers share similar views
—that the primary function of the party is that of successful
replacement of existing governments with one which is ded-
icated to the realization of a collectivist society.
35There is apparently little to no exploration in Chinese
Communist literature as to the political controversy which
turns on the question as to whether such an entity as the
"will of the people" does in fact exist.
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Theory Orientat ion
As tools of explanation and thus understanding, both of
these party models have serious deficiencies. The Communist
theory is highly normative and the responsible government
theory is ambiguous as to its foundations and orientations.
Marx and Engels developed their explanation of human
history as a criticism of the industrial life of their era.
They advocated through their theory a means of establishing
social justice which is a normative concept. As stated by
Riker when he alleges that the inclusion of normative elements
in a descriptive generalizations renders it scientifically
unfit
:
This, for example, is where Marx's endeavor to
be scientific went astray. The main proposition of
Capital can be summarized as "Capitalism is theft,
"
and since theft—when divorced from a positive legal
system— is a normative notion, verification of this
sentence as a description of nature is literally
impossible
.
The concept of "proletariat, " a vital component of the
Communist political theory of social change through class
struggle is itself a normative concept:
The proletariat is a mythical notion and, at
the same time the supreme value, good and justice
—
a positive power. The distinction between pro-
letariat and the bourgeoisie does not record an
illiam H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions
,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 5.
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empirical fact observed as such in actual existence;
it is, first and foremost, an appreciation, a (value)judgment.
Berdyaev adds that Marx could not have based his theory of
social change upon class antagonisms without using normative
judgments as to the social justice provided by different
means of organization of the modes of production. Party, in
the vanguard of this social change, engages in a normatively
oriented function in working to establish a better life for
all.
The responsible government explanation of parties pre-
sents no clear answer as to its normative or empirical em-
phasis. This is because, as Austin Ranney has shown, its
advocates have not been explicit in defining whether they
are discussing parties as they observe them, or parties as
they should be if they are to fulfill their primary task of
the reconciliation of majority desires and minority rights.
Ranney shows this ambiguity to continue to exist as demon-
strated by the landmark study of party government in the
United States which was published by the American Political
37Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution
,
(Ann Arbor
The University of Michigan Press, 1961)
, pp. 68-69.
-^Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Gov-
ernment: Its Origins and Present State
,
(Urbana, Illinois:
The University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 8-10.
51
Science Association in 1950. 39 He accurately observes that
in most of the writings on responsible government and the
mandate concept of parties:
Parties are often referred to in one place as
(a) the existing organizations, and in another as
(b) some possible future variant of them. Functions
(of parties) sometimes means (1) the role the
parties are observed performing, and sometimes
(2) the role they should perform. 40
When discussing parties in sense (a) and (1), observations
are empirical and when in sense (2), judgments are normative.
Theory Inclusiveness
Both the responsible government and the Communist
theories of party are not inclusive enough to explain all of
the relevant phenomena. The mandate explanation is primarily
an explanation of, and a suggested plan for improvement of,
popular control over the leaders of the political community.
This theory does not attempt to explain the concept of party
as understood by Communist observers who regard party as the
active agent of those who are in possession of a cosmic truth
which must be implemented as quickly as possible in the
•^"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, " American
Political Science Review
,
XLIV, (Supplement, Sept., 1950).
4Q Ibid.
, p. 8.
41 52political community. The Marxists regard non-communist
parties as essentially the tools of the bourgeoisie and
therefore not true parties since they are not tuned to the
ultimate goals which society must achieve.
Thus, both of these explanations of party are mutually
exclusive and since neither is broad enough to include the
other, neither can be called a general empirical theory of
parties in terms of its inclusiveness characteristics.
Range of Theory
The responsible government model of party is a middle
range theory. It incorporates many singular generalizations
concerning voter and party activity patterns. These include
the desires of citizens, actions of voters, how changes in
game rules will affect both voters and office seekers, how
aspirants seek and win electoral office, and policy changes.
From these singular generalizations, the observer is able to
move outside the boundaries of his own observables. He can
generalize about other systems that seem to exhibit the
necessary conditions or ground rules so as to appear to qualify
within the definitional bounds that ho has established as the
limits of the phenomenon which his theory is attempting to explain
41Some qualification is here required to account for the
primary function of the party in an established communist
polity as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung.
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This explanation is not a general theory in terms of
theory range since its emphasis is upon function, and the
origin and institutional (structural) aspects of party are
not dealt with to any significant degree within the explan-
atory framework which the mandate model provides.
The Communist theory of party is of general range. The
general principle of organization is that the mode of economic
organization breeds class conflict and this conflict is the
42force behind social change. This explanation of the dy-
namics of human society contains singular generalizations
such as the alleged motivation of different groups in the
political community. In addition, one is able to move to
broader generalizations concerning not only contemporary
political communities, but also the prediction of future
events. That such sweeping generalizations and extensions of
the theory do not always meet the test of validity is not a
basis for criticism of the generality of the theory, but
rather a criticism of its normative foundations. The theory
includes explanations for party origins, structure and func-
tions, and the place of party in the social dynamic. It must
be classified as a general theory in terms of range because
42 " " ...
Maurice Duyerger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences
with Special Reference to their Methods , trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 239.
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of the wide scope of phenomenal characteristics which it
attempts to explain.
Conceptualizations of Political Party
The responsible government explanation of political
parties is a mental construct which is highly reflective of
assumptions concerning man's capacity and propensity to gov-
ern himself which were dominant in Western Europe and North
America in the century and a half following the French Rev-
olution. The theory conceptualizes party as the vehicle
through which political man is enabled to exercise his alleged
desire to participate fully in his own governance and his
assumed capacity to act rationally within the context of the
Utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest
number, rather than within a narrower context of individual
43
self-interest. The political philosophy supporting this
explanation has little room for an economic type of "indiv-
. . 44lsible hand" such as that postulated by Adam Smith.
The widespread and rapid utilization of this explanatory
framework for parties—both by influential students of parties
43
.
This view was dominant but by no means totally accepted
as the writings of such observers as Alexis deTocqueville,
Edmund Burke, or Alexander Hamilton and James Madison demon-
strate. See especially Madison's Federalist #10 .
44
The Wealth of Nations
,
(New York: Modern Library, Inc.,
1937; originally published in 1776).
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and by politicians—plus its generally uncritical acceptance
as conventional wisdom until the post World War II method-
ological revolution in the Social Sciences, 45 demonstrate
that this approach to the explanation of parties comes within
the context of what Karl Mannheim called "ideology."46 Not
until well into mid-century did party theoreticians such as
47 48Schumpeter and Schattschneider
, in advance of the method-
ological revolution called behavioralism, seriously question
the normative conceptual frameworks within which "democratic"
political parties were being explained. The 1950 report of
the Committee of the American Political Science Association
demonstrates that the idea of responsible parties, as a goal
to be striven for, was still very much alive.
In contrast to the responsible parties theory of demo-
cracy, the theory of political parties developed by Karl Marx
49is clearly a "utopian construct," in the sense that, while
45There are many exceptions to this general acceptance of
the majority of scholars. See, for example, Arthur F. Bentley,
The Process of Government
,
(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press
,
1908)
.
46
Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology
of Knowledge
,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., n.d.;
originally published in 1936)
.
47Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy .
The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy
In America.
4
^Mannheim, see especially Chapter 4.
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most of the conceptual elements of his explanation of his-
torical development were present in his intellectual ante-
* ^ 50 , .cedents, his synthesis of conceptual elements and the
explanatory function of his philosophy of history were clearly
marked deviations from the dominant wisdom of his time. Thus
Marx, in his early emphasis upon individual alienation and
social disintegration of the family and other primary groups,
was reacting to the social thought dominated by an individ-
ualistic conception of human motivations. Lenin and Mao,
within the context of the specific polities in which they
operated in their pre-revolut ionary phases, were also clearly
on the Utopian end of the Mannheim dichotomy.
Both the responsible government and the communist party
explanations now express dominant social values for major,
but exclusive sections of the globe and the task of contem-
porary party theorists is, in part, to surmount the normative
epistomological relativity of both explanations if a general
empirical theory of political parties is to be generated.
50Examples are the dialectic in Hegel and the idea of class
struggle developed by men such as Saint-Simon. For discussions
of Marx's intellectual precursors see Irving M. Zeitlin,
Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory
,
(Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 3-79, and
Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
,
(London:
Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 7-120.
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As Anthony King has demonstrated, 51 the level of ab-
straction at which political party is conceptualized has
important ramifications for the type of question concerning
parties which the theorist is motivated to ask. Party, when
conceived as a cluster of human actors, generates questions
concerning party ideology, structure and organization. When
party is conceived as a pattern of human activities, the
theorist is able to:
. . .
consider the consequences of parties and party
systems—their existence, structure and behavior
—
for political systems as a whole.
^
In the writings of the responsibile party theorists,
parties were conceived of at the higher level of abstraction
thus generating questions concerning party as the producer of
53consequences for the political system as a whole. This
position is consistent in the writings of Wilson, Ford and
Goodnow to the extent that the consequences of the entity
party which they wished to establish in the American system
of government, were increased levels of, and more direct voter
51 •3XKing.
52
Ibid
.
, p. 115.
53King suggests that these observers conceptualized party
as a group, "as they were bound to do given their reformist
aims," (p. 133.) My focus of analysis is upon their theory
of party rather than their reformist propensities. In the
former or explanatory aspect of their studies, these observers
conceived of party in terms of its systemic consequences.
58
control over, the actions of elected officials. The weakness
of this level of abstraction is a failure to ensure that the
concept is:
.
. .
defined at all precisely, with the result thatit may be impossible to know how one would go aboutdetermining whether statements containing it were
true or false.
This conceptual weakness also shared decades later by the
Committee of the American Political Science Association, 55
has resulted in explanatory ambiguities which inhibit this
explanation as a contribution to a general empirical theory
of parties.
The Marxist-Communist explanation of parties, like the
responsibile government construct contains both a pragmatic,
low level of abstraction where party is conceptualized as a
collectivity, and a higher explanatory level where party is
regarded as a producer of system-wide consequences. On the
one hand party is described as the "vanguard of the proletariat
In other instances in the writing of Marx, Lenin and Mao, party
is discussed within the context of the anticipated consequences
which the existence of the party will have for the polity. The
available evidence suggests that Marx, and to a lesser extent
pre-revolutionary Lenin and Mao, conceptualized party as a
54Austin Ranney, see especially pp. 8-10 and p. 157.
55Report
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special group of dedicated revolutionaries. After their
successful revolutions, Lenin and Mao placed more entasis
upon parties as the agent of systemic occurrences. This
shift in emphasis to a more balanced approach in their ex-
planation of parties is no doubt due in large part to the
unique role which the communist parties of the Soviet Union
and China have been called upon to play in the evolving of
these socialist polities.
Thus, as an explanatory tool in the understanding of
communist political parties, the conceptual level utilized by
Marxist theoreticians is weak because of ambiguities of ref-
erent.
Summary
The two most comprehensive early attempts to explain pol-
itical parties, the mandate-responsibile government and the
communist explanations have been outlined and analyzed in
terms of their validity as empirical general theories of
parties. Both have been demonstrated to be unsatisfactory,
the responsible government theory on all counts and the
Communist on three of the four standards of analytical assess-
ment. The responsible government explanation is exclusive,
of only middle range, and its proponents are not clear as to
whether they are discussing parties in a normative or an
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empirical context. In addition, the level of conceptual-
ization of the dependent variable is such that tautologies
are encouraged. The Communist theory is a general theory in
terms of range but it is of very high normative content, like
the mandate explanation is also exclusive in that the full
range of phenomena to be explained is not included, and it
suffers from inexplicit conceptualizations. Thus neither
explanation serves as a valid basis for a general empirical
theory of parties.
We now turn to what Maurice Duverger called his "pre-
liminary general theory of parties" to attempt to apply the
same standards of assessment in order to judge its validity
as a general party theory.
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CHAPTER III
j
THE DUVERGER APPROACH TO PARTY THEORY
i
We have suggested that for a theorist to present a valid
claim to have developed a general theory of political parties,
his construct must pass the tests of: (a) resting upon an
adequate base of empirical observables, (b) including all of
the relevant phenomena to be explained, (c) being of broad
range, scope or reach, and (d) demonstrating conceptual
adequacy of the dependent variable to be explained. Two major
efforts to understand the phenomenon "political party," the
responsible government and the communist explanations have
been shown to be inadequate as general empirical theories of
parties according to the above criteria. The work of Maurice
Duverger in explaining parties will now be analyzed. 1 We
will suggest that the primary contribution of Duverger is that
of providing two empirical generalizations concerning parties,
one of doubtful validity, and taxonomies based upon parties
and party system structures, but no general empirical theory
of parties.
.
Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and
Activity in the Modern State
,
trans, by Barbara and Robert
North, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951).
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Duverqer and Methodology
Many scholars who are concerned with methodology agree
with Duverger 2 that necessary steps in empirical theory con-
struction would include (1) explicit definitions which demon-
strate the parameters of, and describe the phenomenon to be
explained; (2) taxonomies of specific empirical occurrences
of the phenomenon which are useful and valid to the extent
that they emphasize independent and intervening variables
and demonstrate the allowable ranges of variable influence
upon the phenomenon; and (3) generalizations which contain
or imply empirically testable hypotheses. It is our con-
tention that the work of Duverger, in his book Political
Parties
,
is at the taxonomic level of achievement in theory
building, a necessary step in the process but one which is
not yet at the level of "preliminary general theory." 3
An assessment of his contribution to analytical stasiology
must therefore be concerned with an analysis of the validity
of his generalizations concerning parties and party systems.
2Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences with
Special Reference to Their Methods
, trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)
.
3Political Parties, p. XIII.
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In his later work on methodology of the social sciences,
Duverger has stated that the generation of valid generali-
zations of "sociological laws" requires two preliminary levels
and a final level of scholarly activity.
Three levels of scientific research can be dis-
tinguished in the physical and social sciences: thelevels of description, classification and explanation.
Formulation of laws is present only at the last stage
• • •
It is the contention of this observer that Duverger
' s Pol-
itical Parties does not contain generalizations which are
valid with regard to all parties, 5 and that his "Law of Party
Number" with reference to electoral systems and party systems
is valid only part of the time.
The Classification Scheme of Duverger
In Political Parties the author uses as the basis of his
classification of parties the structure of the individual
party. He is aware of other factors such as ideology, his-
torical context and socio-economic influences, but to him
party
organization is tending to become an essential factor
in the activity of the party, in its influence and
4 "•' ."An Introduction to the Social Sciences. . .
, p. 226.
The work of Duverger is especially weak in any explan-
ation of, or even reference to, Latin American, African or
Asian parties or party systems.
its function. These facts explain the generaltenor of the book. b
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Duverger goes on to say that party organization may be
considered as superstructure and the other factors as sub-
structure, the influence between these two levels is a two-
way street, and that for him modern party evolution is best
explained by a study of party structure and organization. He
then classifies parties on the basis of his perception of the
party organizations and he discovers parties to be "central-
ized" and "decentralized." He discerns two criteria of mem-
bership, "cadre" and "mass" parties and he perceives dif-
ferences in parties which are based upon the federal as op-
posed to the unitary geo-political organization of the polity
Duverger outlines various classifications of parties
which are based upon his perception of party structures. He
does not give us a "preliminary general theory of parties."
One observer has commented that:
Duverger does not keep to his original method-
ological promise. Instead of a continuous testing
of a hypothetical working model, we get sound and
methodical classification.
. . as the pilot work
for further stasiological studies. 7
^Political Parties.
. p. XV.
7Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings
on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics
,
Vol. 19, #3,
(August, 1957), pp. 423-440 and especially p. 433.
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Another observer states that "Duverger seems, at times, to
be interested only in description and methodical classifi-
cation. 1,8
To Duverger himself, there appears to be a confusion as
to the nature of his contribution to a general party theory;
at which of the three levels of explanatory activity his
Political Parties should be placed.
In the preface to this work he states that his aim is to
sketch:
... a preliminary general theory of parties, vague,
conjectural and of necessity approximate which may
yet serve as a basis and guide for detailed studies. 9
He continues that his work is designed to introduce objectivity
into what he regards as a highly normative field of inquiry,
that his work supplies a methodological classification of
parties and that it:
. . .
formulate (s) hypotheses capable of guiding
further research which will one day permit the
formulation of authentic sociological laws. 10
Given his goal of the development of a preliminary general
party theory which will point the way for further research in
QFerdinand A. Hermens, book review in The Review of Pol-
itics,, XIV, (October, 1952), p. 558.
9Duverger, Political Parties.
. p. XIII.
Ibid.
, p. XIV. To Duverge
laws" are valid generalizations.
10 r, "authentic sociological
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this area, we must attempt to discover and outline his theory
so that it can be measured against the criteria of theory
orientation, inclusiveness
,
range and level of conceptual-
ization, standards which have been presented in this paper
as being measurements with which to assess the validity of a
general empirical theory of parties.
Political Parties is divided into two sections, the first
dealing with individual parties, and the second with national
party systems. The most general "sociological law" or gen-
eralization is stated in Book II where Duverger is dealing
with party systems rather than with individual parties. On
the other hand, Book I does not present any generalizations
concerning all parties. It is concerned with classification
of individual parties in a cross-polity approach but not an
approach which is universal in scope. Both sections of the
work emphasize the structure of parties and of party systems.
In this emphasis Duverger chooses to study parties as instit-
utions. He then implies that structure is the most important
variable leading to an explanation of the phenomenon called
party.
. .. .
the principal object of this work ( Political
Parties ) is. . . essentially the study of party
institutions and their place in the state.
. .
Modern parties are characterized primarily by their
anatomy.
11
Ibid... / p. XV.
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Thus, party structure rather than party function is the
aspect of the study of political parties which Duverger
chooses to emphasize. He assumes that function will follow
from structure of both party and party system and that it
can be explained in terms of a comparative study of instit-
utional structure.
The "Theory" of Political Parties
What is the essence of the theory of parties of Duverger?
In the opinion of some scholars 12 and of this observer, he
has given us no theory of individual parties or of party
systems but rather a narrow gauge or singular generalization
involving one variable only, that of the individual electoral
system or political community within the context of which the
party system operates. This generalization concerns the in-
stitutional context and the result is Duverger 's now famous
"Law of Party Number" which holds that "... the simple-
majority, single-ballot system favors the two-party system."
Duverger adds in the next sentence that
. . .
of all the hypotheses that have been defined in
this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps to a
true sociological law.
. . The exceptions are very
12See, for example, Frederick C. Englemann, p. 433.
13
Political Parties.
. .
, p. 217.
rare and can generally be explained as the result
of special conditions. 14
In addition, regarding multi-party systems in specific pol-
itical communities, he states that:
... the simple-majority system with second ballot
and proportional representation favor multi-partism. 15
Duverger has himself admitted that there are exceptions to
these generalizations, as have other observers who appear to
have less faith than he in these "sociological laws." 16
If we beg the question as to the validity of this "Law
of Party Number," we must deal yet with the Law as the most
obvious example of Duverger s "preliminary general theory of
parties." m so doing it becomes obvious that, at least with
14T ,Ibid,
15 Ibid.
, p. 239.
16See especially the critique by Aaron B. Wildavsky, "A
Methodological Critique of Duverger ' s Political Parties,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, (May, 1959), pp. 303-318, 'and
the work of John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems,"
Midwest Journal of Politics
. Vol. II, #4, (1958), pp. 357-376.
Grumm finds many West European examples which are at variance
with Duverger' s Law of Party Number. In addition, see Douglas
Rae
'
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws
, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 108-109.
However, other observers such as V. 0. Key and Carl J.
Friedrich lend support to the thesis of Duverger who has
apparently recognized his critics in that a later work of his,
in discussing the alleged relationship between numbers of
parties and the electoral system, is less dogmatic. Duverger,
The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society
, (London:
Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1966), pp. 114-116.
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respect to these generalizations, the author is referring to
party systems within the context of individual political
communities and not to specific parties within a cross-polity
frame of reference.
Theory Orientation
We have suggested above that an analytical framework
with which to assess a general empirical theory of parties
consists of measurement of the explanation by means of the
four criteria of explanatory orientation, inclus iveness
, level
of conceptualization, and theory range or scope. To what
extent does the party explanatory work of Duverger measure
up to these criteria? There seems little doubt that Political
17Parties is an empirical effort. Duverger has confined his
efforts to furthering the explanation of existing party en-
tities and has not attempted to suggest what parties or party
systems should be. His quest for sociological laws of parties
has neither a base of highly normative assumptions such as
the communist explanation, nor has he demonstrated or ientational
17
"The main pioneering work in the systematic empirical
study of party systems is Maurice Duverger ' s Political
Parties (1951)." Harry Eckstein, "Political Parties," Part
II. "Party Systems," International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences
, Vol. 11, (1968), p. 429.
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ambiguity of the type demonstrated by many observers of the
responsible party approach to explanation.
Theory Indus ivencss
The "preliminary general theory" of Duverger is more
inclusive than either of these other two explanations in that
both competitive party systems of the responsible variety,
and monolithic parties of the communist variety are included
in his taxonomic formulations. 18 However, as stated above,
his work includes little of explanatory value to assist us in
understanding parties and party systems in the Third World of
allegedly politically underdeveloped polities of Latin America
Asia or Africa. Even if we grant legitimacy to his claim of
developing preliminary theoretical tools, the omission of
many of the parties and party systems of the globe renders
invalid any claim to his work being a general explanatory
effort. However, on the level of party origins and structure
Duverger has provided a series of incomplete but useful con-
cepts as a preliminary base upon which taxonomies of Third
World parties can be constructed.
•
•Some critics of Duverger have seen even this degree of
inclusiveness as a distinct disadvantage. F. A. Hermans
argues that "Duverger 1 s conclusion begins on a pessimistic
note and reads almost like what Robert Michels wrote on the
'Iron Law of Oligarchy.' Part of this pessimism may again be
due to the fact that he (Duverger) deals with totalitarian
parties on the same level as with the others.
.
." Hermens,
p. 561.
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Duverger and Party Conceptualization
j
With respect to the level of conceptualization of party
utilized by Duverger, his work clearly demonstrates that he
conceives of parties as clusters of human actors rather than
as patterned interactions. This is shown by his explanatory
emphasis upon the structure and organization of parties and
party systems and his almost total ignoring of the:
.
. .
consequences of parties and party systems—
.
their existence, structure and behavior— for pol-
itical systems as a whole. 19
His later diluted "Law of Party Number" does suggest system-
wide consequences resulting from particular electoral arrange-
ments but even in this instance the level of conceptualization
is of the first order, as demonstrated by his failure to deal
with the societal effects which differing electoral modes
might, or in fact actually do, generate. In addition, Pol-
itical Parties contains no recognition of the fact that elec-
toral systems are sometimes devised independently of the de-
sires of party members, the decisive thrust coming in such
instances from interest groups, tribal organizations, or
Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity
,
Vol. 2, (Winter, 1969),
p. 115.
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other conglomerates which have a perceived stake in the
political processes of the polity. 20
We have stated that the act of observer conceptualization
is the expression of his value preferences and, in addition,
the degree of acceptability of his concepts is a reflection
of current conventional wisdom within his discipline. Thus
the responsible party explanation enjoyed widespread and
quite uncritical success for many decades because of the inter-
pretation of this explanation which emphasized its normative
aspects in support of democratic values. The communist party
explanation, in the first half-century of its dissemination,
was the antithesis of the responsible party government ex-
planation. As such it lacked a geo-political base to support
its claim to legitimacy. Over the past half-century, the
expansion of this base to include half of the globe has greatly
increased its explanatory acceptibility
.
The Duverger conceptualization of party, because of its
greatly reduced normative content in comparison to either of
these other explanations, has enjoyed widespread academic
support because of the timing of its presentation at the
20Indigenous administrators in newly freed colonies—as the
former agents of the colonial power—have exercised consider-
able influence in the establishment of electoral ground rules.
Such rules have often been first established by the colonial
power. See Lucian W. Pye, "Party Systems and National Devel-
opment in Asia," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds .
,
Political Parties and Political Development
,
(Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 369-398, especially p. 383
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beginning of the behavioralist thrust in Political Science
which followed World War II. The Duverger explanation pre-
sents us with a useful attempt to overcome the normative
epistemological relativity of both the responsible party
government and the communist explanations of political
parties
.
The Range of Duverger
' s Theory
The explanatory framework of Duverger is an example of
scholarly effort of the middle range of theory building. In
his book Political Parties he has moved beyond the area of
singular generalizations concerning the covariance of two
variables as described by David Easton, 21 and has incorporated
into his preliminary theory, explanations of both party
origins and party structure. Some scholars have argued that
Duverger has placed too much emphasis upon the structure of
parties and party systems as the single most important ex-
planatory variable. Samuel Beer holds that Duverger tries to
explain a rigidly doctrinaire party on the basis of its struc-
ture but a complete explanation should also be cognizant of
of the possibility of such factors as individual member
21 _ "' •' ' • '
A Systems Analysis of Political Life
,
(New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 7.
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beliefs, the constitutional structure of the polity, and the
locus of party militants within the geo-political polity. 22
Another observer has criticized Political Parti p. by sug-
gesting that Duverger assumes that:
.
. .
political party phenomenon can be largely
explained through the independent use of three var-iables: party structure, party systems and the
electoral system. Other factors such as social and
economic structure, national history, culture, in-
stitutional traditions, geography, climate and so
on are either rejected neglected, or relegated to
peripheral roles.
.
Another student of political parties, Sigmund Neumann, in an
article in which he discusses political party theory, makes
the point that Duverger places exclusive emphasis on formal
party structure as the key to party behavior and ignores
"
.
. .
social mass base and ideological commitments." 24 A
critical question in theory construction is the choice of a
basis for the typology to be used.
There is thus wide agreement of opinion among students of
parties that a structural approach to party explanation, while
22Samuel Beer, "Les Partis Politique," The Western Pol-
itical Quarterly
, Vol. VI, pp. 9-53.
23Wildavsky, p. 309.
Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Theory of Political Parties,"
World Politics
, #6, (July, 1954), p. 559.
75
useful in the generation of a general explanation, is only
another step in the construction of a general empirical
theory of parties and not the "preliminary general theory"
of parties as offered by Duverger.
One observer has suggested that each major section of
Duverger 's book contains a single important contribution to
the study of parties. Book I offers his classification of
party structures:
.
. .
(in which) he is very successful. Systematic
classification done with scientific neutrality, use-
ful categories such as direct and indirect parties,
caucus, branch, cell and militia type basic organ-'
izational elements: cadre and mass parties and
electors, supporters and militants
.
2 ^
Book II offers his "Law of Party Number." Englemann does not
seem to feel that there is an excess of party types and sub-
types. In addition, he does not question Duverger ' s choice
of party structure as the critical variable in his taxonomy.
Duverger and the Functionalist Approach to Party Theory
The implied assumption of Duverger appears to be that a
taxonomy of parties which is based upon their structures will
lead to valid generalizations concerning parties, from which
a general theory of parties can then be constructed. However,
25Englemann, pp. 423-440.
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parties exhibit not only institutional structures, but also
engage in functions and these functions are more universal
in nature than are structural attributes. 26 Thus it should
be possible to devise a functional typology of parties which
contains fewer divisions, and fewer exceptions, than the
typology based upon origins and structures which is presented
by Duverger.
Abraham Kaplan states that:
The function of scientific concepts is to mark
the categories which will tell us more about our
subject matter than any other categorical sets.
Without suggesting a blanket negation of the work of Duverger,
what is herein suggested is that a structural classification
of parties is only a partial step toward a general theory of
parties. What is needed in addition is a typology which is
cognizant of the functions which parties perform. Such a
functional taxonomy should free the observer from the limit-
ations of the individual polity, or special conditions with
2 6
"Recourse to functional typologies is indispensable for
the comparative study of very different societies: instit-
utions are too unlike to provide a satisfactory basis for
comparison. It is also possible that in some respects the
functional approach is more fruitful for the elaboration of
general theories than the institutional, approach, " Duverger,
An Introduction to the Social Sciences.
. .
, p. 235.
27 ~ -—
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry : Methodology for
Behavioral Science
, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.,
1964), p. 52.
science
:ions
which the structuralist typology of Duverger appears to be^
prone. Duverger himself, in his work on social
methodology, states that there are three basic foundat
upon which a typology can be constructed: (1) institutional
or structural, (2) relational, and (3) functional. With
regard to the functional foundation he admits that:
Recourse to functional typologies is indispen-
sable for the comparative study of very different
societies: institutions are too unlike to provide
a satisfactory basis for comparison. It is also
possible that in some respects the functional ap-
proach (to classification) is more fruitful for the
elaboration of general theories than the institu-
t iona 1 approach
.
2 8
By the time of the writing of this later work on method-
ology, no doubt Duverger would no longer claim that his
earlier study was a "preliminary general theory of parties."
His later opinion as quoted above appears to contradict his
claim to a theory or perhaps even a preliminary theory of
parties in his earlier work, Political Parties
.
The importance of party function is also stressed by
Almond and Coleman who state that:
If the functions (in a political system such as
interest articulation, aggregation, communica-
tion, etc.) are there then the structure must
be., even though we may find them (the structures)
Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences.
. . ,
p. 235.
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tucked away so to speak, in nooks and crannies ofother social systems. 13
It thus seems that a strong case can be made for a tax-
onomy of parties, based not upon structure alone, but pri-
marily upon the common functions in which they are seen to
engage. Such an approach, because of its cross-polity char-
acteristics, is more apt to eventually yield a general theory
of parties than is the more narrow and unique structural
approach of Duverger.
In his perceptive critique of Duverger, Aaron Wildavsky
concludes that if the current quest for general party theory
is to be advanced, political parties need perhaps to be
studied not according to "surface forms" or party institutions
but in the functions they perform.
. . .
the utilization of surface factors such as the
number of parties, the type of ballot, and the type
of party structure do not appear to provide the kind
of proposition to provide an adequate theory and/or
typology of political parties. 30
It is to an exploration of the opportunities and limitations
upon the search for such relevant propositions that we now
turn our attention.
29Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds
.
, The Pol-
itics of the Developing Areas
,
(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton
University Press, I960), p. 12.
30Wildavsky, pp. 317-318.
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CHAPTER iv
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL PARTY THEORY DEVELOPMENT
It is our contention that the responsible government,
the Marxian, and the Duverger explanations of parties are
inadequate with regard to both the stated and implied value
bases of the theorists, and also concerning some aspects of
methodology utilized to explain the phenomenon of political
party. We have also suggested that, at the present stage of
understanding of parties, a fruitful avenue of further in-
quiry leading to the eventual goal of a general empirical
theory of parties is to be found in an exploration of the
functional similarities of parties. The utilization of
functional explanations has been strongly questioned by
some philosophers of science and has been just as strongly
defended by other observers. 1 The philosophical question
raised by these conflicting epistemological and method-
ological viewpoints bears directly upon the adequacy of the
existing general explanations of parties and also upon our
as yet to be presented path for future theoretical effort.
"''Functionalism has been strongly attacked in its log-
ical and substantive aspects by, among others, Carl C.
Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in L. Gross, ed.,
Symposium on Sociological Theory
,
(New York: Harper & Row,
1959), pp. 271-307. Classic functional analyses include
Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society
,
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950) , and Robert K. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure
,
rev. ed., (New York:
The Free Press, 1957).
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The two philosophical aspects of greatest concern to
our analysis of general party explanations are the epis-
temological question of the nature of social reality, and
feasible approaches to an understanding of this reality.
Our exploration of these two concerns serves the dual pur-
pose of demonstrating additional weaknesses in the existing
explanations of party and of laying the groundwork for our
justification of our proposed methodological approach to a
general party theory. We will here discuss the philos-
ophical weaknesses of existing general party explanations
and in the following chapter will defend a functional ex-
planation of selected dimensions of the phenomenon political
party as a necessary step in the generation of an empirical
party theory.
Epistemological Considerations
The observer who is interested in the generation of
valid explanations must address himself to the question of
what sort of data is adequate to support his theoretical
construct. The philosophers of science are divided into
two groups on this question, the positivists and the neo-
I 2
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idealists. ' The epistemological question of the nature of
the observer's conception of social reality determines to
which of these two groups he belongs. The positivists:
.
. .
contend that prediction is the key criterionfor adequate explanation, that the adequacy of one'sdata relative to one's hypotheses or theory lies inthe resulting ability to predict patterns in a
given realm. Opposed to this group are sociologists
.
. .
who see understanding as the basis for ade-
quate explanation.
That valid understanding and prediction are not the same is
clearly demonstrated by the capacity of observers in past
ages to accurately predict solar eclipses based upon their
conceptualization of a geocentric universe.
The positivist position on the question of knowledge
of social reality is that there are no fundamental differ-
ences between physical and social phenomena and that the
methodology utilized to explain the former is also applicable
to the explanation of the phenomena of social science. Ob-
servers of this persuasion are thus prone to maintain that
the most acceptable, if not the only allowable methodology
2Various labels are attached to these different points
of view. The Positivists are also referred to as empiricists
and logico-empiricists , while neo-idealists are also called
intuitionists (Runciman) and subjectivists (Frohock) . See
Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social
Research
,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), especially Chapter
11, W. G. Runciman, Social Science & Political Theory
,
(London:
Cambridge University Press, 1963), and Fred M. Frohock, The
Nature of Political Inquiry
,
(Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey
Press, 1967).
3Sjoberg and Nett, pp. 288-289.
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to explain social man, is the logico-deductive approach.
This approach, in its ideal manifestation, discovers valid
universal generalizations or covering laws and from these
deduces the applicability of the generalization to specific
occurrences of it. The social order is perceived as being
mechanistic to the degree that the actions of men, singly
or in groups, are governed by laws which, if they are not
constant, change so slowly that long range valid generali-
zations are possible. The methodology of this approach to
explanation has been summarized as:
.
. .
explanations require the adducing of general
laws, with the status of empirical hypotheses about
the natural order, from which, in conjunction with
statements of initial conditions, we can deduc-
tively irjfer statements about empirical conse-
quences
.
This has been a widely accepted methodological approach to
the explanation of social science phenomena since its clear
elucidation by John Stuart Mill. 5 Its acceptability is
currently defended by philosophers of science such as Nagel 6
7
and Braithwaite. Within the study of Politics and Government
4Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences
,
(London: The Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 46.
5
Mill, A System of Logic
,
(London, 1879)
.
Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in
the Logic of Scientific Explanation
,
(New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1961).
7
Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation , (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1960)
.
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its most vocal defender is Eugene J. Meehan. 8 These ob-
servers defend the unity of explanation under the rubric of
THE Scientific Method. This method is held to be applicable
to the explanation of both physical and social phenomena.
The Scientific Method
The deductivist social scientist who strives to explain
political phenomena envies the physical science observers
because in the latter area prediction is much more advanced
than in other fields of inquiry. The success of physical
science inquiry is in no small measure due to the use of
what is called the "scientific method" of inquiry.
This method should not be equated with the field of
knowledge itself though. As will be argued below, the
subject matter with which the physical sciences deal is much
more conducive at the present stage of knowledge to the
application of the logico-deductive mode of inquiry than is
thinking man—the subject matter of the social scientist.
As stated by Ernest Nagel:
It is the desire for explanations which are at
once systematic and controllable by factual evi-
dence that generates science; and it is the organ-
ization and classification of knowledge on the
8Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis
,
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965.)
basis of explanatory principles that is the dis-tinctive goal of the sciences. 9
He goes on to say that the scientist seeks to formulate
general conditions under which events occur and to make
statements concerning these conditions as the explanations
of the observed happenings. in generalizing about the ob-
served events, the making of statements concerning their
alleged causality, the observer is engaged in scientific
inquiry to the extent that he seeks to "establish some
relation of dependence between apparently miscellaneous
items of information.
.
."
10 To Nagel this is the heart
of scientific inquiry.
Man seeks knowledge of the phenomena surrounding him,
and to this end he observes what occurs and inquires con-
cerning the observations which he, and others, have made.
The goal of his inquiry is explanation of the phenomena
observed.
The kinds of explanations that are considered
desirable or possible in a discipline will help
determine the approach to the subject matter, the
phenomena selected for investigation, the infor-
mation sought, the manner in which the data are
treated and the jerification procedures employed
in the inquiry.
Q
^Ernest Nagel.
Ibid
.
, p. 5.
"^Meehan, p. 88.
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If we remain within the bounds of formal logic, explanations
of occurrences in the field of physical science are more
powerful than those of the social sciences in the sense that
predictability is more common in many instances. Predict-
ability suggests repetition of at least some attributes of
the phenomenon to be explained. Thus, some degree of reg-
ularity or duplication of at least a few aspects of the
observables is necessary if the phenomenon selected for ex-
planation is to be explained according to the logical re-
quirements of the ideal scientific method of the physical
sciences. At the heart of this method is the generali-
zation.
When a science is highly developed, its gen-
eralizations can be summarized into a terse code;
that is, a set of statements so arranged that a
few major ideas serve as. premises from which all
other propositions or hypotheses will follow. In
an immature science the principles may do little
more than define and classify characteristics,
thus setting the staje for the future development
of a deductive code.
The explanatory power of a valid generalization is perhaps
best exemplified by Newtonian physics where the concept
gravity, the mutual force of attraction between any two
bodies, explains an apple falling to the ground and the
movement of the planets around the sun.
Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith,
eds. , Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political
Behavior
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 68-69.
Deductive Reasoning and Social Scj^nc^ s
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Deductive reasoning is based upon a general statement
or generalization. A generalization attributes:
. . .
particular properties to some or all of the
members of a well defined, nonvacuous class and thus
provide (s) a link among members of that class.
Clearly, the ability to generalize is in some degree
contingent on the nature of the subject matter; some
objects are more easily drawn into general state-
ments than others. 3
Deductive reasoning requires universal generalizations
as a starting point and as previously stated, universal
generalizations relevant to the subject matter of interest
to social scientists are almost, if not totally impossible
at the current stage of development of the social sciences.
Thus it would appear that for the present, from the logico-
deductive perspective, the tool of deductive reasoning as a
method of explanation is unavailable to social science.
Meehan has outlined five reasons why, on the practical
level, political science is unable to make use of deductive
reasoning. They are: (1) the complexity of the subject
matter; (2) the difficulty of conducting controlled ex-
periments; (3) the human capacity to learn and thus to alter
his behavior; (4) the tendency of generalizations to be
culture-conditioned; and (5) the influence of personal
13
Meehan, p. 91.
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values of the individual observer. 14 The phenomena and the
environment in which they occur thus would appear to rule
out of political analysis and theory building the use of
rigid logical deduction.
A possible way to surmount this alleged barrier will be
suggested in this thesis. For the present our remarks will
be confined within the limits normally used to restrict the
conduct of social science inquiry.
With deductive reasoning held unattainable by some
positivists, the social scientist is thus forced, according
to the logico-deductivists, to use probabilistic or tendency
generalizations and inductive reasoning.
When the premises do not suffice to imply
the conclusion but nevertheless have some weight
as evidence in favor of it, the argument is said
to be inductive.
Inductive reasoning based upon tendency statements:
. . .
provide (s) evidence, not deductive proof for
a particular proposition. A more serious short-
coming of tendency statements, however, is that
they impose no predetermined limit on the evidence;
they are exceptionally difficult to verify, for
verification is an act of judgment—not the ap-
plication of a criterion. Taken alone a single
tendency statement is almost useless; it must be
bound with other statements into a coherent theory
14
Ibid.
, pp. 105-109.
15
L. Susan Stabbing, A Modern Elementary Logic , 5th ed,
rev., (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1952), p. 5.
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before it acquires significant explanatory
power. D J
The Epistemology of Marx and Duverggr
The explanations of the social phenomenon political
party of Karl Marx and Maurice Duverger are in the positvist
or logico-deductivist tradition. These two explanations
are based upon the same epistemological foundations and
demonstrate both the strengths and the weaknesses of the
logico-deductivist approach to the generation of theoretical
explanations in the social sciences.
The positivistic orientation of Marx is clearly shown
in his emphasis upon the unity of methodology of both phys-
ical and social science. His proposed dialectical method
of inquiry and explanation incorporates a blending of both
epistemological and methodological elements and leads to
what he called "objective" or "scientific truth"—an eventual
absolute truth applicable to the explanation of all natural
phenomena
.
.
. .
natural science will in time incorporate the
science of man, just as the science of man will in-
corporate natural science: There will be one
science
.
l6Meehan, pp. 115-116.
17
'Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844," as quoted in Marx-Engels, Selected Works II
, p. 153.
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A contemporary student of Soviet Russian thought contends
that the position is yet viable in Russian scholarship. The
methodology of the dialectic will enable social scientists
to both explain and predict the future course of human
events. This source states that:
In the judgment of Soviet writers, the Marxist
dialectical method is not merely a scientific
method in the strict meaning of the term. in add-
ition to being the ultimate method for studying
social phenomena, it represents at the same time
a most advanced theory of cognition, a most pro-
gressive political ideology, a method for the rev-
olutionary transformation of old social orders into
new ones, a method for the conduct of domestic and
international policies, and finally a method for
foreseeing and predicting the future. 18
Thus, to Marx and to modern Marxists, the unity of natural
phenomena is a reality and the same explanatory process, the
dialectic, is applicable to both of its divisions, the
physical and social elements.
If the criterion of an acceptable scientific explanation
is its predictive capacity, then the Marxian explanation of
the phenomenon political party has a rather strong claim as
. . 19to its utility. However, this assessment does not
18Michael Jaworskyj, Soviet Political Thought: An Anth-
ology
,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 3.
19From the methodological perspective we are not making
the assessment in the Marxian dialectical sense. Our em-
phasis here is upon the alleged empirical ("scientific") but
in fact normative generalizations upon which the whole
Marxian explanatory edifice is constructed.
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recognize the normative foundation upon which the Marxian
explanation rests. Unless one accepts specific value judg-
ments with regard to the transitive worth of various modes
of social organization and the concomitant evolutionary
perspective with respect to social change, the explanation
has little claim to the status of a general theory of
parties
.
The explanatory framework of Duverger is also positiv-
istic in that he is dedicated to a unitary scientific ex-
planation for all natural phenomena.
The first aim of science is to formulate laws
which describe constant relations between phenomena.
These laws.
. .
make possible the prediction of the
phenomenon "N" when phenomenon "A" is present.
In practice the discovery of laws is possible only
in the most advanced sectors of research: there are
still few such sectors in the social sciences. 20
Duverger thus suggests that the explanation of all natural
phenomena can be accomplished via the same methodology and
that the "retarded" level of explanation in the social
sciences is a consequence, not of the inapplicability of
physical science methodology alone, to social phenomena,
but primarily because of a far greater number of independent
and intervening variables which affect the dependent variable
in a social science explanation. Once the barriers of
Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences
with Special Reference to Their Methods
,
trans, by Malcolm
Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 226.
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of variable identification and quantification have been
surmounted then prediction is possible. To Duverger, pre-
diction is synonymous with explanation
In principle the level of explanation is alsothat of prediction.
. . m all sciences, howeverprediction runs into a certain number of diffi-
culties and these are serious in the social sciences. 21
The Duverger explanation of parties does not rest firmly upon
an obviously explicit value foundation except for a general
implication that parties are a good thing, so a critique of
its empirical validity is inappropriate. However, it does
demonstrate a serious weakness which is a result of the
evaluatory emphasis placed upon prediction within a scien-
tific explanatory framework of methodological unity. Many
observers deny this unity of method in explanation of nat-
ural phenomena and propose a different approach to explan-
ation when the object of explanation is human. The epis-
temological weakness of the Duverger attempt to explain pol-
itical parties is contained in, and demonstrated by, the
intuitionist or subjectivist critique of positivist phil-
osophy.
21
, . aIbid.
, pp. 227-228.
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Meaning and Social ArHnn
The proponents and supporters of the subjectivist epis-
temology allege that the physical and the social sciences
are distinct bodies of knowledge 22 and that these differences
arise because of the different nature of the phenomena to
be explained. To these observers, understanding rather than
prediction is the criterion of an adequate explanation of a
social, as distinct from a physical science phenomenon. The
subjectivists hold that in order to generate an acceptable
explanation of phenomena which contain a human element, the
observer must be cognizant of both the historical dimensions
and of the subjective aspects of human behavior. Unlike
the physical scientist, the social theorist is able, and
must "get inside" his subject matter in order to include in
his explanation the subject's perception of reality—his
ideology or frame of reference. 23 The capacity of the ob-
ject of explanation to engage in perception, cognition and
to make value judgments suggests to the subjectivists that
prediction is a very incomplete standard by which to judge
the validity and completeness of explanations. It is argued
22Leading examples of this position are Max Weber and
Talcott Parsons.
23
In the terminology of perhaps the foremost intuitionist
,
the subject's "definition of the situation," Talcott Parsons
and Edward Shils, eds
.
, Toward A General Theory of Action
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).
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that this non-mechanistic view of the social universe re-
quires that proposed explanations demonstrate an "under-
standing" of the subjective dimensions of human thought and
action because of man's active role in the shaping of his
environment. In this view, an adequate explanation of the
human action of placing a name on a piece of paper requires
the observer to know whether the marks on the paper repre-
sent a legitimization of a death warrant or an act of
judicial clemency.
Thus, in contrast to the logical empiricists, such as
Duverger, the intuitionists contend that a valid explanation
of social phenomena consists of more than a painstaking
and narrow gauge search for an exhaustive list of all pos-
sible influencing variables by means of outside observation.
Such a methodology can be quite successful in the delin-
eation of structural and historical influences upon the
phenomenon to be explained24 but its weakness in social
science is that such a restricted methodology does not lead
to a systematic search for the subjective variables which
are indispensable for an explanation which includes both the
necessary and the sufficient conditions or variables. Thus,
the Duverger explanation of political parties is a partial
^^Duverger 1 s Political Parties: Their Origins and Act-
ivity in the Modern State is an excellent example of this
logico-deductive methodology.
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explanation and the author claimed no more than this status
for his efforts. But, in addition, his positivistic epis-
temology and methodology, while adequate for explanation of
the dimensions of the phenomenon which he chose to explore,
are not adequate for the search for the remaining (suffic-
ient?) variables which a general empirical theory of parties
must contain.
Epistemolocrv of the Responsible Party Theory
The philosophical foundation of the mandate or respon-
sible government explanation of parties, as exemplified by
Woodrow V7ilson, suggests no clear and consistent position
on the epistemological question of the nature of the subject
matter to be explained. Wilson demonstrates that he is not
a positivist:
I do not like the term political science.
Human relationships whether in the family or in the
state, in the counting house or in the factory, are
not in any proper sense the subject matter of
science. They are the stuff of insight and sym-
pathy and spiritual comprehension. 25
This passage appears to place Wilson in the intuitionist
tradition. But the type of explanation of political parties
?5Wilson, "The Law and the Facts," American Political
Science Review
, #5, (1911) , pp. 1-11, as quoted in David
Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of
Political Science
, 2nd ed. , (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1971), pp. 67-68.
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which he offers shows that the dominant thrust of his theor-
etical work is descriptive and prescriptive. As we have
suggested above, the domination of normative values in an
explanatory framework is counter productive to the gener-
ation of empirical theory. This weakness is particularly
evident both in the Marxian and in Wilson's explanations of
parties
.
The reformative coloration of the mandate theorists
continues down to the present era, as the work of the Amer-
ican Political Science Association committee demonstrates. 26
The task of the development of empirical party theory is not
advanced but is inhibited by the weaknesses of both epis-
temology and methodology exhibited in both the Marxian and
responsible government explanations of political parties.
Duverger and Marx share the same epistemological orien-
tation to the extent that the subjective element of human
development is not emphasized by either observer. For Marx,
human potentiality is determined by objective conditions of
the material environment. Duverger, by his emphasis upon
the structures of political parties rather than more
^"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American
Political Science Review
,
Supplement, (September, 1950) . For
a recent study see Bernard S. Broder, The Partys Over: The
Failure of Politics in America , (New York: Harper & Row, 1971)
Also worthwhile is James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy ,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), Chapters
9, 10, and 14.
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subjective party elements, chooses to explain that aspect of
the phenomenon party which falls within what he calls "mat-
erially objective facts." 27 Thus Marx explains nQt Qnly
political parties, but the all-inclusive phenomenon social
man from an epistemological position which he shares with
Duverger. This position is that of a unity of natural and
social explanation.
Marx and Duverger differ in that Marx does not recog-
nize the basic value position which undergirds his epis-
temological approach to explanation, while Duverger is
aware of values and constructs his explanation so that the
subjective dimensions of the phenomenon are excluded. Thus
Marx gives us a general but value-based explanation of
parties and Duverger, while avoiding this trap, presents us
with a value neutral but partial party explanatory frame-
work. Woodrow Wilson is aware of the subjective dimension
of human existence but his party theory is at least as value
based as that of Marx. He recognizes that human values must
27Duverger states that "... certain social facts are
only images and have no existence outside consciousness.
Others, in contrast have existences external to consciousness
and are also something else as well as images. These can be
called 'materially objective facts.'" He then gives as an
example of a materially objective fact, "... the structure
of parties or pressure groups.
.
." An Introduction to the
Social Sciences.
. .
, pp. 28-29.
be taken into account in the exnbn.fn Planation of social phenomena
but his explanation of nolit-i^i « ^ •p ical parties is rendered almost
useless by his failure to recocm-i^ ,• 4. *xc gnize the introduction of his
own personal value system. This weakness is endemic to most
of the defenders of this approach to party explanation.
It is our contention that if general empirical explan-
ations of human activity patterns are possible and will
eventually be developed, such explanations will be deductive
in nature. The arduous task of attaining this goal will
require the utilization of preliminary explanatory frame-
works which demonstrate an awareness of the subjective
dimensions of man. Thus, further work in the development
of a general theory of political parties must bridge the
epistemological and methodological gap between the positiv-
ists and the subjectivists
. Neither the Marxian nor the
Responsible Government explanations of parties are adequate
vehicles for this advance, the former because of the overt
value position of its supporters and defenders. The pos-
itivistic claims of Karl Marx are somewhat obscured by- his
emphasis upon the methodology of the dialectic rather than
logico-deductivism but a basic premise of his general social
explanation is that capitalism is theft and as Riker has
demonstrated, when the concept theft is removed from the
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context of a specific legal system then it- hpy own, n . becomes a norm-
ative idea. 28
The politicaX party explanation of Duverger Is a step
in the right direction in that he is aware of the existence
of the subjectivist position, but his efforts at explanation
are restricted to those organizational and structural as-
pects of parties where participant values are least in
evidence. it is our contention that through the develop-
ment of a functional model of parties, the epistemological
positivist-lntuitionist gulf can be bridged and the search
for a general and empirical party theory be advanced.
We now turn to an examination of the feasibility of
presenting a functional model as a vehicle for the eventual
development of empirical theory.
William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions
.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 5.
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POLITICAL PARTY EXPLANATION
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
It is our contention that general empirical explanations
of human activity are at least theoretically possible. it
is further contended that the logico-deductive approaches
to a general party explanation of Karl Marx and Maurice
Duverger are weak in their explanatory power, the former
because of its basic value assumption with regard to the
author's ethical judgment on the ownership of property, and
the latter because of Duverger s choosing to ignore the sub-
jective dimension of human activity. m addition, in our
opinion, the use of the logico-deductive methodology by these
two observers, is premature. The responsible government
explanation of party is the weakest of the three theories
because, as formulated by Woodrow Wilson, this explanation
recognizes subjectivism but is so permeated with Western
political values such as rationality and political par-
ticipation as to render it a historically unique and narrow
gauge attempt to explain the phenomenon political party.
Recent observers on parties have continued to reflect this
narrow Western bias.
At the present level of knowledge of political parties,
the pressing task in the search for a general explanation is
the rdentification and, if possible/ quantification Qf§ ^
many as possible of the multiplicity of variables which
influence the choice of individual actions by the human
actor. When this task is complete or perhaps near to com-
pletion we should then be able to describe the necessary
and sufficient conditions which generate a human activity
pattern. As we approach the possession of a full inventory
of these variables, the utilization of the powerful explan-
atory tool of logico-deductivism will become available to
the social theorist/ but at the present immature stage of
explanation in the social sciences, our energies should be
directed primarily toward the search for the unknown,
elusive, and for the most part subjective, variables.
The partial party explanation of Duverger emphasizes
the structure of parties and party systems, and because of
this emphasis the explanatory power of the Duverger formu-
lation advances our knowledge of the phenomenon to some
degree. This advance is made in spite of Duverger
' s pre-
mature commitment to the logico-deductive explanatory frame-
work and thus his lack of emphasis upon the subjective
1It appears possible that this stage in the development
of explanations in social science will be reached when we
can begin to develop a valid inventory of "sufficient" var-
iables to explain the occurrences of specific social phen-
omena
.
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dimension of social man. Xt is our contention ^ ^
dimension can be explored and clarified through the gener-
ation and development of a functionally based analytical
theory or heuristic framework which will enable us to iden-
tify additional independent variables and thus further
explore new dimensions of those specific repetitive action
patterns which we have called political parties. 2
DMinition and Heuristic Model Expiation
It is our contention that the following strategy should
be utilized in the search for a general theory of political
parties. First, the reality to be explained, the dependent
variable, should be empirically defined so as to (a) clearly
demonstrate its uniqueness from all other phenomena, and
(b) the observer should describe shared characteristics of
all instances of occurrence of the phenomenon so as to
warrant including specific instances or occurrences of the
phenomenon within a single terminological designation.
The word "action" is used here in the sense that Talcott
Parsons uses it. According to Parsons an "action" is res-
tricted to goal-directed or meaningful choices on the part of
the individual. Parsons excludes from this concept such
human activities as the activation of reflexes. Parsonian
conceptualizations have gone through many formulations. This
"social action" concept is perhaps most clearly developed in
The Structure of Social Action. (New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1949), and The Social System
. (Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1951)
.
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The next step is then to search for independent var-
iables, both the necessary and sufficient conditions, so as
to be able to account for the dependent variable. In phys-
ical science explanations this step can usually utilize the
logico-deductive approach in the use of quantified data,
in the social sciences we must often utilize additional
explanatory devices such as heuristic models to enable us
to unearth previously ignored, or yet to be discovered
independent variables. These models are especially valuable
when the dependent variable is some dimension of subjective
human activity patterns.
When using such models, the criterion of acceptability
is not necessarily empirical refutation if the model allows
us to discover previously unknown or unrecognized independent
variables, the consequences of which can be, at least in
theory, empirically tested for their validity. In addition,
such heuristic models can disclose new linkages between
existing known variables.
Our immediate task then is to empirically define the
social phenomenon political party and then to attempt to
discover some of the independent variables related to the
subjective nature of man so as to further our search for
a general explanation of political parties. This will be
attempted through the use of an analytical structural-
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functional model of individual party-related activity called
J
Social Satisfaction LevelHodel of individual party-related
activity. Through the generation of such a model we can hope-
fully spotlight previously neglected porcess-related variables
which have a bearing upon an eventual general explanation of
parties, both in their structural and procedural aspects. Our
emphasis here is upon the motivations of the individual who is
active in a political party, the party seen as a social struc-
ture by means of which the individual is able to realize at
least some of his action-directed goals. The party is thus
functional to the individual as a means by which he is able
to increase his personal life-satisfaction level.
Functionalism and Explanation
The utilization of a functionally based explanatory
framework is an approach which is fraught with pitfalls,
both epistemological and methodological. Many philosophers
of science have raised objections to the claim that this
approach to explanation can further our understanding of
social phenomena. The claim is often made that no
3Such objections are most often raised by those phil-
osophers of science who are defending the positivist path
to explanation. See, for example, Carl G. Hempel, "The
Logic of Functional Analysis" in Llewellyn Gross, ed.
,
Symposium on Sociological Theory
,
(New York: Harper & Row,
1959), pp. 271-307. Another positivist critics is R. Dowse, "A
104functionalist explanation is Dnq^w Q u • ,possible which is not teleo-
logical in nature-that is
. that an ^ ^.^
or discovered by the researcher to which the action to be
explained then becomes supportive or functional. Thus, some
oritics allege: no teleology, no functional explanation,
in addition, some social theorists have challenged the claim
of functionalists that their explanatory approach is unique.*
This allegation must be recognized if a useful application of
functionalism is to be brought to bear upon social phenomena
explanation. A third criticism of the use of functional
explanations is contained within the holist/individualist
controversy which revolves around the question of the basic
unit of social analysis.
Functionalist Logic," World Politics, (July, 1966), pp. 607-622. in his critique of Gabriel A. Almond's use of func-tionalism, the main criticism of Dowse is that Almond is notpresenting a theory as he is alleged to be claiming-Dowseholds that Almond's work is not subject to refutation. How-ever, Dowse concedes that " ( structural-functionalism)
has sensitized students to complex relationships, has'drawn
attention to the social setting of politics, and has proved
a valuable corrective to rationalizing and moralizing."
(p. 618). it is for these purposes that we, as did Almond
are using a functional explanatory framework.
4See, for example, Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Func-
tional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthro-
pology,
"
American Sociological Review
. Vol. 24, (Dec., 1959),
pp. 757-772. The argument here is that functional explan-
ations are only a subset of the widely utilized causal chain
explanatory framework.
These criticisms contain varying degrees ^
but their durability demands fchat Qbserver ^ ^^^^
the functionalist explanatory tool clearly present and
justify his conception as to how the functional approach to
social explanation furthers understanding of social phencnena
and, in addition, clearly demonstrate that the valid crit-
icisms of this approach have been recognized and surmounted.
Functionalism and Individual! sm
The suggestion that an observer is utilizing a func-
tionalism mode of explanation immediately embroils him in
the individualistic critique of this explanatory framework.
Critics of this approach allege that the only viable social
unit which is empirically explainable is the human indiv-
idual and that it is logically indefensible to ascribe pur-
poses or end-states to a social collectivity. 5 Opponents of
this viewpoint maintain that a social collectivity often pos-
sesses characteristics which disappear when the whole is
5The most extreme point of this position is that ofKarl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Povertyof—Historicism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) Popper
argues that the holistic approach to social explanation pavesthe way for general public acceptance of collectivist social
philosophies such as communism and fascism.
106
broken down into its basic human units..« The development
of a "mob psychology" is often cited by holists as an ex-
ample of a collectivist property which disappears when the
group is dispersed by a show of force. The individualists
such as Popper and George Homans 7 appear to ignore the point
that in the search for regularities in human actions, social
observers are continuously utilizing an analytical fiction,
the typical individual rather than the unique. 8 Thus the
observer is seeking common social properties or character-
istics and the holist- individualist debate becomes a non-
starter
.
Are We All Functionalists? 9
Some social scientists have alleged that the func-
tionalist mode of explanation is pervasive in both physical
and social explanation because functionalism is in reality
6Although modern sociological studies are usually
grounded upon this assumption, the classical statement of
this position is Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in
Sociology, (New York: The Free Press, 1951; originally
published in France in 1897)
.
7Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), and Popper.
QThis point is well developed in Alan Ryan, The Phil-
osophy of the Social Sciences
. (London: Macmillan and
Company, 1970), Chapter 8.
9See Kingsley Davis.
107a particular type of causal ovvoYP t explanation of the, "if function
•X', then functioning system -y- exists," variety. 10 This
Position is not tenable in social science explanation be-
cause social systems are not empirical observables but are
analytical constructs which are created to emphasize inter-
relationships between and among independent variables. The
analytical definition of a system includes the functions
which sustain it and thus the chronological separation or
temporal space between cause 'X' and resultant 'Y' of a
typical causal explanation does not obtain in functional
explanations. The heart of a functional explanation is the
simultaneous occurrence of both 'X' and 1 Y 1
. Thus, in
positing that all explanations of social science phenomena
are types of functional explanations, observers such as
Davis and Nagel11 are missing the point of temporal space.
Functionalism and Teleology
A third criticism of the functionalist mode of explan-
ation is the allegation by critics that those who utilize
10Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry
.(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 59-101.
11_Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation
in the Social Sciences," Language and Human Rights
, American
Philosophical Association, (Philadelphia, Penn. : University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), pp. 45-64.
tUx. mode are required to posit or i,ply purposes or endg as
attainable goals for the system. The question is then
raised as to the possibility of a system having goals even
though it is conceded that an individual human entity can
be in possession of such attributes. This question is
epistemologically related to the individualist-holist con-
troversy in that holists allege that a social collectivity
is greater than the sum of its individual components and
that this collectivity can in fact possess purposes or ends
which are distinct from those of its individual units.
Those who present the teleological critique of func-
tional explanation are often positivists who are committed
to the logico-deductive explanatory mode. At the present
stage of social science explanation, what we have described
as the variable search stage, observers are fully justified
in the utilization of functionally oriented heuristic frame-
works if such frameworks enable us to move to new insights
in the discovery of independent variables. We share with
Talcott Parsons the view that the functionalist explanatory
mode is a temporary or second-best form of explanation.
Given the present level of development in the explanation
of the phenomenon social man, the advantage of the use of
this mode is that:
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. .
the crucial characteristic of structural-functronal theory is its use of the concept systemwxthout a complete knowledge of the laws whichdetermine processes within the system. 12
It is the looseness of fit which is of advantage to us in
our attempts to discover a more complete inventory of the
laws of social processes. These laws are discoverable when
we have available a more complete inventory of the influ-
encing variables. What is now required is an empirically
based working definition of the dependent variable, the
phenomenon for which a general explanation will no doubt
eventually be constructed.
Toward a Definition of Political Parties
The present unorganized state of the wealth of empirical
data available on the subject of political parties suggests
that worthwhile inquiry into this phenomenon of political
life could proceed in the following manner. First, the
observer should study the definitions of party which have
been proposed by competent scholars so as to arrive at a
satisfactory general definition of party. Such a definition
1
2
Talcott Parsons, The Social System
, (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), p. 483, as quoted in William C.
Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories
of Talcott Parsons
. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1967), p. 8.
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should be inclusive enouqh to smn ^y r Pan the range of the phen-
omenon, and contain within it similar^™ * *imilarities of function which
are co-on to all parties." This definition should also
suggest critical variables which, when isolated, might allow
the observer to construct a model which will yield empiri-
cally testable propositions. Such a model wm nQt be a
general theory of parties but only a step in this direction.
The structural taxonomy of Duverger should be supplemented
by a functional approach to party classification. The ul-
timate general empirical theory of parties will, no doubt
,
contain both structural and functional elements.
Following definition and the isolation of the variable (s)
for use in the model, a taxonomy of parties which is based
upon the chosen variable is possible. From the taxonomy the
model can then be constructed and the testable propositions
derived.
Because of the broad diversity of entities which label
themselves political parties, a label which spans the
13In the view of this observer, the structure of anyparty is primarily a reflection of the functions which theparty is seen as the vehicle to perform. Maurice Duverger,
*n Political Parties, suggests that structure is the critical
influence in the determination of what is the entity called
party. Our opinion is that functional/teleological explan-
ations of party are more fruitful than causal/genetic, if a
general party theory is to be developed because functional
similarities of parties appear to be more widespread than
causal or genetic (historical) similarities.
Ill
spectrum from the Communist Party of the People's Republic
of China, to the Prohibitionist Party of the United States,
one is tempted to see, refuge in the approach to a definition
of party such as that used by Rupert Emerson in his analysis
of African political nsrf i^q 14 TTP micaj. pa ties. He cites with approval the
position of Thomas Hodgkin that:
a nrJ
herV^°thing t0 be gained b^ attemptingprecise definition of the term "party" at thispoint..
.
For the moment it is probably most
convenient to consider as "parties" all political
organizations which regard themselves as partiesand which are generally so regarded. 15
Emerson acknowledges that this approach suffers from a
looseness of terminology but he suggests that this loss is
compensated for by "inclus iveness of coverage of African
political phenomena." 16 m a work in which the primary aim
is description of unique parties or party systems, such
looseness of definition is perhaps allowable. However, this
avoidance of the establishment of limits for the political
entity which is being analyzed will not result in the devel-
opment of characteristics which are common to most if not
14Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration inAfrica
'
' Political Parties and Political Development
. Joseph
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds
. , (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), pp. 268-269.
I5ml_Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties . (London:
Penguin African Series, 1961), pp. 15-16.
16Rupert Emerson, p. 2 69.
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all other entitle, called parties, in all parts of ^^
The development of a valid theory or model of parties calls
for a tighter definition than self-designation as such.
Basic Party Charar^ri.n cs
At the most basic level political parties are comprised
of individuals who seek to derive some degree of personal
satisfaction from party membership in return for their sup-
port of the organized entity called a party. Sigmund
Neumann, in his edited book Modern Political Parties says
that "To become a party to something always means identifi-
cation with one group and differentiation from another.
Every party in its very essence signifies partnership in a
particular organization and separation from others.
.
.
"
l7
He goes on to say that what is common to all parties (demo-
cratic, authoritarian and totalitarian), besides partnership
in a particular organization, and separation from others, is
participation in the decision-making process or "at least the
attempt at, and a chance for, such mobilization for action." 18
17 •Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties
,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 395.
Ibid.
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In their definition of modern political parties,
LaPalombara and Weiner state that, in contrast to the pre-
nineteenth century cliques, clubs, factions and groups of
notables who sought to influence, control and often to dis-
place the authorities, modern parties must exhibit:
(1) continuity in organizations.
.
. (2 ) manifest and presumably permanent organizations at thelocal level.
. .
(3 ) self-conscious determinationof leaders at both national and local levels tocapture and to hold decision-making power.
for L™?
Cer
"'
• • ^S30™6 manner (for > drivingt popular support. 3
They define a party as:
. . .
an organization that is locally articulated,that interacts with and seeks to attract the elec-toral support of the general public, that plays adirect and substantive role in political recruit-
ment, and that is committed to a capture or main-tenance of power, either alone or in coalition
with others
.
zu
Observers of an earlier era defined party as a "body of
men united for promoting by their joint endeavors, the nation
interest upon some particular principle in which they are all
agreed;" 21 that party is organized opinion; or, as Benjamin
Constant wrote in 1816 that "A party is a group of men pro-
fessing the same political doctrine." The current emphasis
19
LaPalombara and Weiner, p. 6.
20 Ibid.
, p. 29.
21Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Present Discontents
,
(World Classics, Vol. II), p. 82.
a
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is upon the political party as an enHn, ™= v, •f
^
d tity reaching out into
the local communities, at least in the psychological sense
that the masses are aware that a regime and a political
community exist and that they must identify with this larger
entity, the political community.
Definitional Scop e;
In attempting to define the concept political party,
one pitfall to be avoided is that of linking the definition
to one particular philosophy of government. This narrowness
appears in the LaPalorabara and Weiner definition when the
authors speak of the party as seeking "electoral support."
The support of the masses does not necessarily have to be of
the electoral variety in which there is a choice of power
holders. In some non-democratic political communities the
vote may be of a plebiscitar ian nature or the authorities
may dispense with the act of mass voting altogether. The
crucial idea is that the masses recognize a particular group
of authorities as legitimate.
In the broad sense the parties are comprised of indiv-
iduals who perceive strength in numbers and who combine with
others throughout the political community so that they are
able to exert influence upon the incumbents, and to them-
selves occupy the positions of effective decision making in
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the regime. The essence of ra rf„p ty is strength through com-
bination and organization and the primary reward is the
exercise of political power. 22
Power and Party
The theme of power is a recnrronf ™« •sr u e t one in attempts to
define parties. Max Weber has defined parties as:
La\t:^°
1Unt
^
Y aSSOciations for propaganda andagxtation seeking to acquire power in order to
.
. .
realize objective aims or personal advan-tages, or both.
McKenzie, in comment upon this definition says that these
"objective aims" may be of greater or lesser importance in
providing the basis of association and the motive force for
the activity of a particular party. But, he adds, there is
.
. .
little doubt that it is the collective pur-
suit of power which is of overriding importance.
It is obvious too that during the pursuit of power
and after it has been achieved, parties mold and
For the purposes of this paper the concepts power,
authority, influence and control will be treated as synonymsSome writers such as Max Weber and Harold Lasswell havediscussed the distinctiveness of each of these terms—othersin a more general treatment have not attempted to differen-
tiate. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," BehavioralScience, Vol. 2, #3, (July, 1957), pp. 201-215. For the level
of discussion and analysis herein attempted, the Dahl approach
appears adequate and is used unless otherwise stated.
23
R. T. McKenzie, "Parties, Pressure Groups and the
British Political Process," The Political Quarterly
. Vol. 29.
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party systemT24 Part outsioe of the
It can be argued that those organized groups called
lobbies, pressure groups and interest groups which are
"outside the party system," fulfil! the established criteria
for parties in that they are organized groups of individuals
who are seeking political power and influence. The critical
difference between pressure groups and parties is that
pressure groups concern themselves with obtaining outputs
from the legitimate authorities which are favorable to their
members. They usually operate within the framework of the
regime without attempting serious disruptions of the stability
of the political system or community. Normally the members
do not wish to displace the authorities but to influence
them.
In contrast to the narrowness of the aims or goals of
pressure groups, parties demonstrate a wide range of demands.
They are multi-level organizations with an interest in be-
coming the legitimate authorities in a political community
which has developed to the degree that the bulk of the
masses have a least a minimal awareness of the scope and
authority of the central decision makers.
24
Ibid.
. p. 8
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^ definiti°" °f P-ty of Sigmund Neumann is inclus . ve
enough to describe parties i„ most
, if not >u
political communities. It is not confined fcQ democratic
systems only. It is a functional definition in that the
essential activities of parties are included and the use of
party as a means of access to positions of political power
is emphasized. Neumann states that political parties are:
The articulate organization of society's ac-tive political agents, those who are concerned withthe control of governmental power and who competefor popular support with another group or groupsholding divergent views.
. . the great intermediary
whrch links social forces and ideologies to officialgovernmental institutions and relates them to pol-itic^ action within the larger political commun-ity
.
This definition, because of its inclusive character,
its functional orientation and its emphasis on the power
aspect of parties, seems to this observer to be useful in
defining, in general and inclusive terms, the concept pol-
itical party. The primary weakness of the definition is
that the scope and degree of "society's active political
agents" is not stated so that it is clear what level of
activity on behalf of the party is required of the individual
in order to qualify him as an active political agent.
25 .Sigmund Neumann, p. 396.
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Membership and Par-hy
Party membership, the degree of identification with,
and activity in furthering the party aims and goals is held
by Duverger to be primarily dependent upon the formal struc-
ture of the particular party. Thus he constructs a taxonomy
having "cadre" and "mass" parties, parties of "community,"
"association," and "order," "direct" and "indirect" parties. 26
He recognizes that the individual's identification with, and
level of activity on behalf of the party is a characteristic
peculiar to each individual, but argues that the aims and
goals of the party determine its structure, and that the
structure of the party strongly influences the degree of the
individual member's active identification with the group. He
states that the links which bind the member to the party are
a function of the type of membership, "direct" or "indirect."
In parties with direct membership the degree of individual
member participation divides those who have identified with
the group into what Duverger calls supporters, adherents,
militants and propagandists. These groupings "form a series
of concentric circles of ever-increasing party solidarity." 27
Maurice Duverger, Book I, Chapter II, pp. 61-132.
27 Ibid.
, p. 61.
119Thus, both Duverger and Neumann refer ^ ind . v . duai
participation as an element in the definition of poiitical
party, Neumann makes no attempt to he specific and Duverger
suggests that participation,
"the Ur* which binds ^ ^
dividual to the party,^ cannot be measure(J ^^ ^
degree but should be regarded as different types of par-
ticipation
.
Since party membership spans the spectrum from the ex-
treme of verbal self-identification only, to the opposite
extreme of the total commitment of life as required by
communist and Fascist parties, fruitful analysis requires
that a stable criteria of party membership be established.
To relate party membership to the degree of participation
is a sound approach to a workable definition in that member-
ship is a voluntary act on the part of the individual and the
success of the party in the realization of its aims and goals
is at least partially dependent upon the activity level of
the membership of the organization. Since we assume that
those who voluntarily accept membership in a party are
favorably disposed toward the successful realization of the
organizational goals, it follows that mere identification
with the group, a psychological identification only, with no
overt physical activity on its behalf, does not constitute
28 Ibid.
120
active membership in the mrt„ c ,par y. Such persons, i„ Neumann's
terms, are not "active political agents. "29
P
Party members are those who are active in the affairs
the aims and goals of the party over a sustained period of
time. The Neumann definition of political party is accepted
as a working definition for this paper, with the addition
that active party membership is comprised of active pol-
itical agents who engage in partisan activity on a regular
basis over an extended period of time. m terms of the
taxonomy of Duverger, our use of the qualified definition
of Neumann includes Duverger
' s "militants" and "propagan-
dists" as party members, and excludes "adherents" and "sup-
porters." This differentiation is based upon the degree of
party related activity in which the various classifications
of party identifiers are thought to engage.
and wl
e
n
te
p
W\ Milbrath in Political Participate,Why Do People Get Involved in Polite i^,., ~niMcNaliy and Co., 1965), in establishing his theoreticalframework, divides the public into two general classes,the activists" and the "apathetics . " The activists arethen divided into "spectator, » "transitional, " and "glad-iatorial activists. Our definition of party as stated
above contains as party members only the gladiatorial act-ivists of Milbrath.
Differences of group motivations are crucial to a tax-
onomy of parties which is based upon the party functions of
providing a means of psychological satisfaction for the
power instinct of the individual party member. if, in order
to construct a model of parties, this function of party is
the most basic, then we must clearly differentiate between
political parties and other voluntary, sub-national, power
oriented groupings of individuals found within the polity
such as those whose efforts are directed toward the attain-
ment of economic, military or spiritual power.
There is in most definitions of political party the
implied assumption that there is a boundary of party goal
perception which separates those entities which are oriented
toward political power from other groups in society which
may or may not be referred to as parties. These latter
groups may be formed for purposes of fellowship, worship,
study, or agitation for reform, but the critical difference
between them and true parties is that parties are social
organizations, the individual members of which are disposed
to act to extend calculated control over a perceived unit of
122their more remote environment. 30 By this we mean ^^
members desire to exercise control over the actions of others
who are not close to them in either a physical (spatial) or
a functional sense:
The most widely and generally perceived unitof more remote environment within which a unifiedpattern of calculated control activities operatesand exists is, in modern tixaes, the nation-state! 31
Political parties, then, as entities, can be differentiated
from other organized social groupings in that parties strive
to achieve or maintain legitimate control over the authority
apparatus of the nation-state; in short, to exercise pol-
itical power, 32 in contrast to other social groups whose aim
is to influence segments of, or the whole of, the citizen
body. We are not concerned with the members' personally
perceived ultimate ends of either parties or interest groups
but we are making a distinction between the instrumental ends
of the two groups which is based upon their relation to the
30The concepts "remote environment" and "perceived unit"
in relation to the political process are used here in the
sense that they have been developed and explained by Neil A
McDonald in his The Study of Political Parties
. Short Studies
in Political Science #26, (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday
and Co., Inc., 1955), pp. 77-88.
31 Ibid.
, p. 81.
32As defined by Robert A. Dahl in Modern Political An-
alysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963),
p. 50, where he refers to power as the possession of coercive
influence.
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control the authority structure while the other groups
will often seek to influence but do not strive for open
control. If these latter groups cross this threshold, they
then become political parties. Thus, the Prohibitionist
Party in the United States cannot be realistically termed
a party even though it is active in the contesting of elec-
tions on a national scale. it does not appear to be in a
position to even hope to aspire to control of the more
remote environment. It uses the electoral process as a
platform to gain publicity for the single issue in which it
is interested. The most realistic position to which it can
aspire is to influence Americans, and one of its chosen
means to accomplish this goal is through publicity which it
gains by entering active candidates in national and local
elections
.
In contrast to this group, the Beria faction in Soviet
Russia which attempted late in 1953 to seize control of the
formal and legitimate political apparatus of the remote en-
vironment, was moving in the direction of becoming a pol-
itical "party." Beria worked in conjunction with his top
aides of the Soviet police system and his attempt at forcible
take-over was thwarted only at the last minute. 33 By having
33Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Inter-
pretation
, (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 181.
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as an instrumental goal the propensity to achieve control
over the more remote environment and by engaging in activity
toward this goal, the Beria group in Soviet Russia became a
fledgling political "party." This threshold between party
and other groups in society was crossed when the plotters
believed that it was possible for them to achieve control of
the state governing apparatus and when the bulk of their
activities, as a group, was directed toward this end.
Political Party Defined
In summary, political parties are voluntary organizations
of active political agents, comprised of those who concern
themselves and who are concerned with the control of the
legitimate monopoly of coercive power which is located at
some level (s) in the organization of the state. They hope
sooner or later to compete for popular support with another
group or groups with similar aims and not necessarily di-
vergent goals. They are the great intermediary which link
or desire to link social forces and ideologies to the official
governmental institutions. They must be locally as well as
regionally or nationally articulated or actively strive to
be, so that the people identify with the larger community.
Parties demonstrate some continuity of stable organiza-
tion. They exhibit a propensity to desire the organization
1 125
and controX of those aspects of life which are
,
by general
agreement, felt to properly lie within the sphere Qf pQl_
itical authority; or they may wish to enlarge Qr ^
sphere of authority. The essence of party is a comment
to sustained and organized group activity to achieve the
positions of legitimate political power which the nation-
state possesses in all post-primitive societies. This
activity, at least in the early stages, can be clandestine
or open depending in large part upon the nature of the
dominant ideology or ideologies concerning the existence of
open opposition.
The Psychological Dimension of Power and Party
The common characteristic of all parties is that they
relate to legitimate positions of power in the political
community such that some individuals are drawn to party
activities as an efficient means to gain control of the rec-
ognized authority structure. Psychological studies of men
suggest that the human need for the possession and exercise
of a degree of power, influence, authority and control of
at least some of the mental and behavior capabilities of
others is almost a universal human trait. This trait is
intimately connected with what is here suggested as the
primary function of political parties—the function of
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providing for the collective cmr<?iii+- ~». • *.Pursu t or maintenance of leg-
itimate political power.
Organized society then is comprised of groups of humans
who reside in political communities which are developed to
the extent that they are perceived as having the capacity
to provide material benefits above the level of subsistence
only. in order to partake of the material comforts which
the community has the potential to, or does provide, the
individual must possess and exercise some degree of power.
The political community has the monopoly of coercive power
which it exercises in an institutional framework which may
or may not be separate from the economy, the other basic
power center in the community.
This need to attain a power position, to share in the
material benefits of society, is complimented by the psych-
ological composition of the individual. Modern psychology
has identified three types of individual motivations, bio-
logical drives, emotions and social motives. 34 The biogenic
drives suggested as being shared by all men are hunger,
thirst, the need for oxygen, sex, excretion and escape from
pain. In addition to these drives which can be satisfied
34Ross Stagner and T. F. Karwoski, Psychology
,
(New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 35-69.
quickly, are the emotions. These emotions can to a high
degree be internalized within the individual.
The third class of motivations which strongly influence
human actions are the social motives. These differ from
biogenic drives and emotions in that they involve inter-
action with others for goal attainment, and the relaxation
of tensions. The social motives are listed as security,
dominance, acquisitiveness, group identifications, and par-
ticular values or a personal ideology.
Psychological research has shown that social motives
are not inherited but are absorbed and internalized from the
cultural environment in which the individual has been reared,
The social values of the culture in which one develops are
at least in part responsible for the determination of social
motives, the patterns of social interaction with others
within the community. This culture conditioning does not
detract from our suggesting the nearly universal power drive
of individuals, because the drive to power has been found to
exist in any cultural community which we have designated as
post-primitive: those which have developed beyond the
village or tribal form of social organization.
Ibid.
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The five social motives of security, dominance, group
identification, acquisitiveness and particular values all
involve to a significant degree the exercise of some amount
of power over others in the community. Thus, the psychology
of man and the economic milieu in which he is situated in
all present day post-primitive societies, both point in the
direction of the attaining and the utilization of power-
economic power by means of control over both man and nature,
and political power by means of control over other men.
If political power accrues to those who successfully
seek it, and since men are mortal, it follows that within
the authority group of the political system there is a
constant shifting of access to various power positions. in
addition, coalitions are recognized as being mutally bene-
ficial. Thus, those seeking to replace and to become the
authorities are motivated by aspirations to positions of
political power. Access to this power is one means of re-
leasing tensions in the individual occurring as a result of
his acquired social motivations. The function of political
parties is to provide a power base from which the men who
are prepared to act in concert can struggle together to
achieve or to maintain their capability to exercise political
power.
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Thus, within the framework of a power-based functional
approach to parties, there are primarily differences of
timing and of method of operation between a contest for
power in the United States and a coup in Soviet Russia. m
most democratic systems men can afford to wait for a chance
at the positions of power because of fairly regularized and
predictable times of formal struggle while in totalitarian
systems the aspirants must act surreptitiously until they
feel conditions are right to move into the open and thus
to reveal the amount of actual and potential power they
control. In both types of systems the functional unit of
operation is the group bidding for power or seeking to
retain it.
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CHAPTER VI
PARTY AND POWER: A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC MODEL
It has been suggested that contemporary man, in his
search for valid explanation of the universe of phenomena,
stands on the shoulders of giants. This assessment is as
correct in the generation of a general theory of political
parties as in any other area of explanatory endeavor. We
have discussed epistemological and methodological weakness
in the Marxian and the mandate/responsible government ex-
planation of political parties and have suggested that the
work of Maurice Duverger is useful but narrow in its scope.
However, further efforts directed toward the generation of
a general exploration must not only be cognizant of, but
must build upon the insights into the party dimension of
social life which these scholars have provided.
A most significant contribution of Marx to the explan-
ation of social man is his development of the conceptual-
ization that man is a materialistically motivated entity.
Explanations of the meanings of social actions are weakened
if the economic dimension of life is ignored. The mandate
party theorists have contributed to our understanding of
parties because of their emphasis on the assumption that man
would act in a rationally self-centered manner, within the
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context of a democratic form of government. By so doing he
would achieve the twin benefits of personal self-development
and the general good of society. 1
Maurice Duverger has advanced the explanation of pol-
itical parties by his emphasis upon variables relating to
party and party system origins and to party and system
structure. Thus, if general explanations of human social
life are possible and if such explanations require the dis-
covery of the multiplicity of variables which influence
social actions, then Duverger has contributed to this dis-
covery process. He has directed our attention to previously
ignored aspects of party origins, modes of organization, the
interrelationship between party ideologies and party struc-
tures, and the chronological evolution of types of parties.
His typologies of parties based upon these variables provides
a basis for the development of insights into the process of
party evolution. The task of general party theorizing
l-An early proponent of this view is John Stuart Mill.
In his Representative Government Mill takes the position that
individual growth and development requires participation in
the decision-making process; see p. 203. Modern social
theorists of a more empirical bent have, of course, drastic-
ally revised the explanation of the operation of democratic
systems. Such observers as Joseph Schumpeter, Bernard
Berelson and Robert Dahl are representative of the "realists"
who describe, and in the case of Dahl and others of a
pluralist bent, define the elite-mass conceptualization of
modern democracy and the role which political parties play
in its operation.
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involves a building upon the insights of our predecessors,
Marx, Wilson, Duverger and many others.
It is now incumbent upon us to describe and develop a
suggestive means by which the search for a general theory
of political parties can be advanced. Our vehicle for this
advancement is a heuristic model of political man which is
based upon specific assumptions concerning his relationship
to the distributive process in any society which is suf-
ficiently advanced technologically to generate a surplus of
material rewards well above the subsistence level and which
has evolved one or more ideologies so as to justify the
attempts on the part of individuals and groups to increase
their personal share of these materials, and also other de-
rived advantages such as power, privilege, and prestige.
The eventual general theory of parties will be of broad
enough explanatory power to explain all dimensions of party
life. It will provide insights into, and generate testable
Our reference here is to what have been variously
called "solidary" and "purposive" incentives or benefits, see
Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A
Theory of Organizations," in Administrative Science Quarterly
,
Vol. 6, (September, 1961)
, pp. 129-166, and the related con-
cepts of "expressive" and "instrumental" activities as dis-
cussed by Peter Blau in Exchange and Power in Social Life
,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). See also the
general argument in Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A
Theory of Social Stratification
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1966)
.
133
hypotheses concerning the motivatiions and activity patterns
of individual party members, and the relationships between
party members and the non-members in a society. in addition,
the general explanation must account for the institutional
structures and processes within specifi
the phenomenon, the patterns of interac ion with the society
manifestations of
of which the party is a part, and in the case of dual and
multi-party systems, the structure and processes of inter-
party competition and co-operation. In the case of multi-
national parties such as the various communist parties, both
international co-operation among national units, and national
difference of tactics and strategy should be explained.
Given a task of this magnitude, the objection can be raised
that any plausible explanation would be so abstract and general
as to be worthless in furthering the understanding of a specific
party, at a given point in time, within a unique national context.
This criticism has been made of such theorists as David
Easton and Gabriel Almond. See, for example, Eugene J.
Meehan
,
Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study
,
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), Chapter 3.
Meehan alleges that the functionalist approach to political
explanation can be useful if rigorously applied to specific
dimensions of politics or other aspects of social life but
the use of this approach by a general theorist such as
Easton or Almond is at best, vague, and at worst, circular.
This criticism is valid only if the methodology of explan-
ation of both physical and social science are the same.
Because of the vast difference in degree of complexity of the
subject matter to be explained this is obviously not the case.
134
One approach to overcome such criticism is to isolate spec-
ific characteristics of social man and to relate the emer-
gence, growth, development and perhaps eventual decline of
political parties to this basic characteristic. m this
way it is hoped that testable hypotheses will be generated
from the emphasis upon previously ignored variables. An
analytical model of social evolution based upon the dis-
tributive process is one possible avenue of explanation. It
is the one chosen here because of its dynamism. We present
one dimension of an analytical model of party dynamics which
will point the way toward tentative answers to questions
concerning the origins and structural evolution of parties,
what parties do, how they accomplish their goals and when
they act. The model will generate hypotheses which can be
subjected to empirical refutation in answer to such questions
as: How can we account for the appearance of parties and
party systems? What functions do parties perform in a soc-
iety? What accounts for inter-party and inter-societal
differences between and among parties and party systems with
regard to the frequency, mode, and duration of inter-party
struggles for office? In this model, party is the dependent
variable. 4 certain assumptions concerning the nature of
"
social man are posited and specific characteristics of the
social dynamic are our independent variables. The result
is an explanatory framework which emphasizes the dynamic
interaction of party and society. This approach is comp-
limentary to the static, structural explanatory explanation
of Duverger while avoiding the highly normative foundations
of the dynamic explanations of the Marxist and mandate/
responsible government explanations of political parties.
Materia l Surpluses and Social Dynamics
The general argument we will develop is based upon the
assumption 5 that the history of post-primitive social entities
called complex industrial societies is a dynamic process
4Of course, political parties can be regarded as either
dependent or independent variables. The choice is a function
of the perspective of the researcher in what he is attempting
to explain of social reality. In his discussion of political
party as a "modernizing instrument," David Apter states that
political party "form is determined by the entire sociopol-
itical framework of the society.
. . they depend upon the
grouping in the society for their membership. In this sense
political parties are dependent variables, with society and
governmental organization, election or co-operation procedures
and the like, the independent variables." The Politics of
Modernization
, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965),
pp. 181-182.
5Our argument is essentially an extension of the social
stratification theory of Gerhard E. Lenski in his Power and
Privilege
.
We are applying basic elements of his general
theory to a specific social institution, political parties.
The dynamic element of his explanation remains basically in-
tact in this formulation.
ce
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which is dependent upon four main factors: (1) the existen
of a national surplus over and above needs as opposed to
wants, 6 (2) unequal allocation of the surplus which divides
societies into at least two main groups, elites and non-
n
elites, (3) the existence of a dominant ideology to explain
and justify the division of the surplus between these two
groups, and (4) the eventual evolution of counter-ideologies
to explain and defend the possibility of changes in the dis-
tribution of the social surplus.
Modern industrial society is presented as a generator
of large material surpluses. An ideology of increased gen-
eral participation in the struggle for changes in the sur-
plus distribution has opened the door of political partici-
pation to self-motivated members of the non-elite groups.
6The difference between "needs as requirements to sustain
life (e.g., food) in contrast to "wants" as a choice of need
sation entities (e.g., beefsteak or beans) is developed by
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
, (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, 1958)
.
7The conceptualization of societies into elites and non-
elites or masses has a long history in social explanation.
The rhetoric of normative democratic theory does not explain
away the empirical fact that in any society the few make de-
cisions for the many, and that these decisions, however ideo-
logically justified their results might be, tend toward a
perpetuation of the unequal allocation of the values of the
society. For a brief, well stated discussion of attempts by
democratic theorists to resolve the tensions between democracy
and elitism, see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic
Elitism: A Critique
,
(Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1967)
.
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These group members attempt to increase their share of the
social surplus by means of an increase in the power and
privilege they are accorded by the remainder of that society.
This struggle is a group effort to advance partisan group
interests so as to increase individual pay-offs.
Additionally, any society moves in a cycle of surplus
allocation from MIGHT to RIGHT to MIGHT—and the dynamic of
this cyclical movement influences the origins, structure
and processes of parties. The legitimatizing ideology is
one of the powerful variables in explaining the dynamics of
societal inter-party interaction patterns. The task then is
to amplify and defend our model and to demonstrate how this
approach to party explanation is fruitful in the discovery
of new variables having a bearing upon the origins, operation
and ideologies of parties and party systems. Such an approach
should further the search for a general theory of parties by
directing our attention to hitherto unemphasized or ignored
dimensions of party existence.
Surplus Distribution and Social Evolution According to Lenski
In his general theory of social stratification, Gerhard
Lenski has provided the student of stasiology with one avenue
to build toward an eventual general theory of political parties.
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His landmark work, Power and^Pr,ivilege : A Theory of Social
Stratification 8 utilizes the materialistic conception of man
of Karl Marx, and the individual self-serving dimension of
man which the mandate party theorists incorporated from
classical laissez-faire economists. Through application of
his broad gauge explanation of the forces generating a
gradual evolution of societies, to the political dimension
of life in general, and the phenomenon political party
specifically, we should be able to supplement the static and
structural discussion of parties of Maurice Duverger with a
dynamic perspective to give insights into how parties emerge,
evolve and interact, with each other and internally.
In brief, Lenski posits that the single most important
key to understanding social dynamics is an understanding of
how the determinations are made to distribute the surplus
material goods which any post-primitive society produces. 9
How individual man stands in relation to a social surplus
distribution process is a key variable in determination of
his social power. Lenski adopts the definition of power
o
Gerhard E. Lenski.
9Ibid.
,
see especially the theoretical portions of his
work, Chapters 1-4, pp. 1-93.
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of Max Weber 10 the power is "the chance of a man or a number
of men to realize their own will in a communal action even
against the resistance of others who are participating in
the action." He then postulates that men seek some combin-
ation of the intrinsic goals of survival, sustenance, health,
status or prestige, creative comfort, salvation and affection
and the instrumental goals of wealth, organized office and
other institutionalized roles, education and training. In
addition, collectivities of people we call societies also
have goals which are not necessarily congruent with every
member of a given society. Lenski defines these societal
goals as:
those ends toward which the more or less coor-
dinated efforts of the whole are directed—without
regard to the harm they may do to many individual
members, even the majority. 1 "'"
The two basic goals of any society are then suggested to be
(a) the minimization of the rate of internal political change
through ruling class emphasis upon some combination of em-
phasis upon law and order, and national security, and (b) the
maximization of material production and the resources upon
which such production depends. This latter goal can be
1QFrom Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
, translated by Hans
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1946), p. 180.
11Lenski, p. 41.
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accomplished by means of some combination of internal re-
source development and foreign adventures.
j
aUth°r thSn PrSSents he calls two laws of soc-
ietal distribution: The first is that, "men will share the
product of their labors to the extent required to insure the
survival and continued productivity of those others whose
actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves..--12 If a
social surplus is produced 13 which is in demand by all or
nearly all members of the society, then the Second Law of
Distribution holds that "power will determine the distribution
of nearly all of the surplus possessed by a society. "I* This
second law operates if, as Lenski contends, men are primarily
motivated by personal or partisan group interests. 15
Lenski has avoided the many conceptual difficulties en-
countered in the use of the concept power by defining the
term in relation to the individual's standing in the surplus
distribution system of the particular society of which he is
12 Ibid.
, p. 44.
_
13This criterion is in fact one of the primary character-istics which distinguishes a post-primitive from a primitive
society since the relative amount of surplus is related to
the degree of institutional complexity.
14 Ibid.
15See p. 128 for a definition and discussion of this and
other empirical terms and analytical concepts.
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a member. He suggests that the concepts privilege and pres-
tige are analytically distinct from power but that both pri-
vilege and honor or prestige are primarily functions of
power. 16 Social power can rest upon two bases, force and
institutionalized power. The latter differs from the former
in that it is based upon the acceptance of the right to
authoritatively allocate social values by groups in a society
having the capacity of replace the allocators. To Lenski,
institutionalized power is constitutional power. He is here
referring to the legitimacy of the existing political regime
and suggests that in any society this legitimacy is part of
a cyclical phenomenon of power based upon a cycle of force,
to legitimate power, and back to force.
The basic units of analysis in his schema are power
classes or classes, and class systems. These elements con-
stitute the fundamental concepts of his explanation of
stratification and they, along with partisan groups, are
6While not denying the analytical and even empirical
distinction which scholars have made among these terms, for
purposes of our party model they will be treated as synonymous
Prestige is defined as "the favorable evaluation and social
recognition that a person receives from others.
. . the sub-
jective dimension of social stratification." David Popenoe,
Sociology
,
(New York: Appleton, Century Crofts, 1970), p.
221. Privilege refers to individual or group advantages
generally recognized by custom, habit or general social con-
sensus. If such recognition is codified into law the pos-
sessors of such social advantages then become an estate.
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herein adopted as the dynamic element of our model of pol-
itical parties. Our framework places more emphasis upon
partisan groups than does Lenski but the historical sweep
and breadth of explanation are narrower since we are con-
centrating on one dimension of social life, the political
aspect, and upon a single component of this dimension, the
political party. In addition, from the chronological per-
spective, parties are a recent phenomenon in the political
area of social life.
Partisan Groups, Power Classes and Class Systems
In his discussion of the self-seeking tendencies of
human actions, Lenski suggests that some human activity
choices are motivated by altruistic considerations but that
these are a minor segment of the whole range of human choice
patterns. In addition, many of the choices which appear on
the surface as being altruistic are, on closer examination,
a form of exchange within the primary group—a system of
mutually beneficial reciprocal actions.
Many actions appear as sacrifices only when the
larger context is ignored. Seen in context, such
actions appear as parts of a mutually beneficial
system of exchange favors."*" 7
17Lenski, p. 28.
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Thus, what appears on the interpersonal level to be self-
sacrificial action is, when seen in the societal context,
not individual self-serving but options chosen by the in-
dividual to further his own interests through the advocacy
of choice options of benefit to a group with which he inter-
18acts on a frequent basis. The defining characteristic of
a partisan group is frequent and personal interaction over a
range of more than one social role context. Two people who
interact in a commercial transaction based upon a cash nexus
only, would not constitute a rudimentary partisan group. If
the scope of the interaction is broadened to include one or
more additional dimensions of face-to-face interactions such
as the buyer and seller sharing membership in the same re-
ligious, political or other social grouping, then a partisan
group is a possibility.
A key component of the explanatory framework of Lenski
is that of classes or "power classes." These are defined as
An aggregation of persons in a society who stand in
a similar position with respect to force or some
form of institutionalized power. ^
18
An example of partisan group interests is Edward
Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
,
(New York:
Free Press, 1958), pp. 9-10. The pattern of extended family
interests taking priority over the general welfare of the
village is well described. In this context the extended
family is the partisan group.
Lenski, p. 75.
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Thus, a power class is not an empirical entity in the same
sense that a caste or an estate is since the total aggregate
of a society which possess a specific level of power in the
surplus allocation process is not a distinct group in terms
of any other social characteristic. Lenski holds that "a
single individual may well be a member of half a dozen power
classes" because "the various forms of power are less than
perfectly correlated with one another." 20 He is thus sug-
gesting that a class is a collective of power loci in various
social institutions, each locus in which the incumbent shares
the capacity to exercise a similar level of control over the
allocation of social values. Two important aspects of this
concept and its use in social analysis are (1) that defining
class in terms of power does not imply that all classes have
power—the expendables in an agrarian society are given as
an example of this case, and (2) a single individual can be
an incumbent of a multiplicity of loci and thus of many dif-
ferent social classes.
Each of the major roles he occupies as well as
his status in the property hierarchy, influences his
choices of obtaining the things he seeks in Ij^e
,
and thus each places him in a specific class.
20Ibid,
21lb id
.
, pp. 75-76.
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Each member of a societ-v iq = ™,wuiety 1S a member of various classes,
his membership and the class being determined by such per-
sonal characteristics as age, sex, race or ethnicity and
education. The customs, habits, mores, beliefs and legal
systems of his society determines the extent to which speci-
fic class members will possess power to influence the dis-
tributive process. The conventional wisdom component of the
culture of a society thus determines how much power an ag-
gregate of people who share a particular characteristic
should exercise in allocating resources for that particular
society.
Since the individuals who constitute a class in a soc-
iety can be categorized according to variables with classes
such as children, young adults or elderly within the age
class, or illiterate or college graduate within the educa-
tion class, an additional necessary conceptual addition to
our heuristic framework is the idea of class systems or in-
2 3stitutional systems. Lenski defines these as being "a
hierarchy of classes ranked in terms of some single criter-
ion" and adds that:
22Some societies exhibit a belief in a messianic ideology
which suggests to its adherents that the whole world should
share the same belief system with regard to class influence
on the distributive process.
23Lenski, pp. 79-82.
146
As indicated previously, each class system ina society contains within it all the members ofthat society. Thus every member of American soc-iety holds simultaneous membership in some classwithin the occupational property, racial - ethnic
educational, age, and sexual class systems. 24
Lenski maintains that the struggle for power, privilege and
prestige occurs in a society between and among individuals,
classes, and class systems and that the struggles on the
levels of systems involve contests between different prin-
ciples of distribution. This is an important conceptual-
ization in understanding the dynamic element of a society
and the element upon which our party model is based. We
argue that characteristics which are generated by industrial
societies and those nations dominated by the ideologies of
these societies have generated the social organization we
call parties and that the study of the struggle for power
among classes and class or institutional systems generates
fruitful insights into other dimensions of party and party
member activity patterns. The theory of stratification as
developed by Lenski is applied by him to hunting and gathering
societies, simple and advanced horticultural societies, ag-
rarian, and industrial societies. The phenomenon party is
unique to industrial societies and to agrarian societies as
a special case, where they exist simultaneously with, and are
24 lb id.
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exposed to the influence of the productivity, the ideology,
and the technology of the industrial societies.
The Rise of Political P^rf les
It is our contention that the social phenomenon we call
political party appeared at a time in history when a re-
ligiously generated philosophy of citizen individualism in-
teracted with an explosion in the capacity of societies to
provide material abundance. The rise of parties then is
largely a result of the Reformation and the Industrial Rev-
olution. In contrast to pre-industr ial societies, those
nations in the forefront of industrialization such as England,
the United States and Germany, were the locus of a new con-
ceptualization of the relationship between the governors
and those who were governed.
The idea that the state was the servant of the citizens
was generated in part by changes in the nature of scope of
warfare—changes introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte. At the
end of the 18th century inter-nation warfare began to involve
the mobilization of total populations and in return for such
participation, the reciprocal nature of citizenship became
clear to ever widening segments of some societies' populace.
Prior to the rise of pressures to expand the granting of
citizenship to greater and greater segments of the
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population, " most inhabitants of a society were not s iraul-
taneously subjected to the ravages and sacrifices of war.
With additional war-related burdens laid upon them, new
groups of the population were motivated to demand a re-
distribution of the allocation of material benefits and thus
of power, privilege and prestige. 26 Existing stratification
systems came under increasing attack. The development of
more rapid and efficient communications networks and the
widespread adoption of the idea that literacy was the right
of an ever increasing proportion of national populations
also facilitated new challenges to dominant distribution
systems. Another contributing factor in this trend was the
discovery and exploitation of new sources of wealth in the
Americas, Africa and Asia. Concomitant with these trends
was the interest generated in Europeans and Americans of the
myth of the noble savage who was alleged to live in a free
state of nature and thus totally responsible for his own wel
fare. All these factors combined to bring into question the
25This point is developed in Walter Mills, Arms and Men:
A Study of American Military History
,
(New York: Pitman,
1956)
.
For a more general treatment see Stanislaw Andrzejewsk
Mi litary Organization and Society
.
(London: Routledge, 1954),
specifically Chapter 2.
? 6As utilized by Lenski, power is conceptualized as the
capacity to influence the distribution of the material social
surplus. Privilege and prestige are primarily a function of
one's distribution power.
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conventional wisdoms concerning the right and proper way to
distribute social surpluses and thus power and prestige.
A vital element then in the evolution of social life is
the constant struggle between the few who dominate the al-
location of resources process and the many who at various
historical points in time are motivated to seek changes in
the allocation process. The many who have a minor share in
the value allocation process of a given society by no means
constitute all of those who regard themselves as being un-
fairly situated in the existing social power relationships.
We are here making reference only to those who seek changes
and combine with others in order to effect these changes in
the social surplus distribution patterns. it is our con-
tention that political parties are the means which have
evolved to facilitate individual and partisan group striving
for increased power in modern industrial society.
Classes, Class Systems and Parties
While any society contains within a multiplicity of
class systems, a consistent pattern of stratification has
persisted, in that one, or at most a very few of the possible
systems, have been generally recognized as being legitimate
as dominating influences in the allocation process. In many
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cultures, for extended periods, possession of land and, re-
lated to it, family lineage, have been the dominant allocating
systems. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, econ-
omic systems which allocate power, privilege and prestige
according to wealth and income first supplement, and later
tend to supplant the older institutional justifications.
When land, lineage, religion or military might are the dom-
inant class systems then the political dimension of life
becomes of secondary importance. Politics is seen primarily
as a bureaucratic and administrative class system to sustain
existing surplus allocation patterns. The interplay of
social forces generated by the interaction of the partici-
pation ethos and the vast increase of material goods re-
sulted in the innovative search for new activity patterns on
the part of some people, to increase their power and priv-
ilege. If the dominant class system (s) in a society are
based upon ascriptive characteristics then the individual
cannot turn to standards of achievement and to class systems
where the hierarchy of power is based upon this latter char-
acteristic. In an achievement culture the relative openness
of the system, in contrast to ascriptive cultures, gives the
individual opportunities he would not have had in previous
eras. It is our contention that, in an industrial society
and in those agrarian societies existing in conjunction with
and influenced by them, that the individual party member
"
will seek to advance himself in the hierarchy of power
through the political class system and that he will try to
accomplish this objective through combination with others
of like mind. These combinations are the phenomenon we
call political parties. These differ from cliques and
factions because the appeal for support from others is made
on a class or class system basis rather than on a basis of
exclusive and narrower partisan group interests. Such ap-
peals are possible only in those societies where three con-
ditions are present: (1) widespread acceptance of achieve-
ment rather than ascription as a basis for the distribution
of power, (2) actual or potential massive surpluses made
possible by industrialization and (3) general agreement, at
least among opinion leaders of the idea of the nation-state
as a servant of the public at large. Thus, a significant
change in the dynamics of the distribution of power and
privilege in societies in the industrial era has been the
increasing importance of the economic and political class
systems as a locus of power to complement, and in some in-
stances replace, the older socially based class systems.
The relative importance of the political class system in
this process is one of our key variables.
152
The Political Class System
in
The dominant position of the political class system
the processes by which power, privilege and prestige are
allocated in any post-feudal independent society is the soc-
ial characteristic which enables us to move toward an even-
tual general explanation of political parties. This cross-
cultural similarity of function allows the generation of an
analytical framework which can lead to new variables bearing
upon the phenomenon and also suggests further avenues along
which empirical testing of additional hypotheses could
proceed. In addition, the concept of class and its posited
relationship to the more general concept of class system,
provides the basis for a dynamic explanatory element to
party explanation which both the Marxist and mandate theories
demonstrate but in which the static taxonomy of Maurice
Duverger is deficient.
The political class system of a polity consists of all
of the social institutions which are primarily concerned with
the authoritative allocation of the social values. At
27While Lenski defines class systems as "a hierarchy of
classes ranked in terms of some single criterion," he does
not specify the criterion which defines the political class
system even though he makes extended reference to it. Lenski,
pp. 79-80.
153
different levels of economic development this allocation
process will be challenged and/or shared with other class
systems. m some societies such as Soviet Russia, the pre-
eminent allocation role of the political class system is
widely accepted. In this latter situation, the inter-system
struggle for allocative dominance is muted and clandestine.
It is also sporatic in contrast to more regularized elec-
toral type contests in other systems. For industrialized
and post-industrialized societies, it appears that the more
the emphasis is upon the political class system as the leg-
itimate distributive element for power, privilege and pres-
tige, the more that society will tend toward a one-party
state. This proposition is, at least theoretically, open to
empirical testing. Contemporary examples such as China and
Russia point in this direction.
At least two other possible relationships between the
political class system and other class systems are observ-
able. The first is in those polities often called developing
nations. In these situations the political class system is
dominant because of a felt necessity to discredit more trad-
itional class systems such as family lineage or property, 28
28 In ex-colonies there is often also a necessity to dis-
credit the native bureaucratic elite which served the col-
onial power.
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and in addition, the need to achieve a rapid absolute in-
crease in material goods dictates strict political control
of the economic class system.
The second national pattern of relationships between
the political and other class systems is found in those long-
time independent nations where vastly increased productivity
is of relatively low actual priority. m much of South
America, for example, military, property and religious class
systems either compete with the political system or dominate
and utilize it to insure their class system dominance singly
or in coalitions among themselves.
There are many other variables which influence the
relative dominance of the various class systems in a polity.
Among these are the ideology, and with it the specific his-
torical pattern, modal period to which the ideology has
evolved; and the extent to which the status of citizenship is
held by the population. Each of these influences also af-
fects the organization, activity patterns and scope of mem-
bership of political parties within the political class
system. An understanding of the phenomenon party to the
point of generation of an empirical theory would require
the tracing out of the inter-connections of ideologies, econ-
omies and citizenship and in turn these influences upon pol-
itical class systems and political parties. Such a task is
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beyond the scope of this present analysis. Our concern here
is to sketch some of the theoretical ranges of variance of
these variables as they bear upon power classes and parties
in nation-state contexts. Thus, new variables to further
eventual general party explanation may be developed.
Ideologies and Political Class Systems
Parties and party systems exist in specific polities
within an ideological context of single ideology, dominant
ideology, two ideologies in rough equality of competition
for dominance of influence, or a fragmented ideological en-
vironment. Examples of these different situations are
Soviet Russia, the United States, Italy, and France during
the Fourth Republic. One important function of ideologies
in any system of stratification is to induce members of the
society to accept as legitimate a given mode of distribution
of the resources of that society. The extent to which a
single ideology is accepted as a way to explain and justify
a specific distribution pattern is primarily dependent upon
the degree to which concerned classes are satisfied at a
given point in time with the distributive process which is
in effect. Counter ideologies function to generate dis-
satisfaction with the dominant distributive system. Leaders
of dissident groups utilize these counter ideologies to
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foment passive resistance and often open revolt. Party is
the mode of social organization for such efforts.
As described by Lenski, the "political cycle" 29 of a
specific regime is, early in its existence, dominated by
an effort to transform a rule of might to a rule of right
so as to increase its retained share of the social product.
This is accomplished by use of a legitimatizing ideology.
The two most basic functions of the middle classes are to
serve the new elite by articulation of the ideology, and by
the performance of administrative tasks which insure that
the social surplus is handed over to elite control. But,
as Lenski contends, reactions by non-elites will sooner or
later develop. These can take the form of individual acts
such as thievery, crimes of violence against the elites and
individual competition for elite favor. In addition, col-
lective activities which are counter to elite interests may
occur. This development, linked by Lenski to the rise of
modern mass warfare, as suggested by him:
may well have been one of the major reasons for the
extension of the franchise in the last century and
for the growing acceptance by elites of labor unions,
workingmen's political parties and all of the other
organizations designed to promote and protect the
interests of the common people. 30
29Lenski, pp. 59-72
30 lb id
. , pp. 66-67.
Thus, at a point in the political cycle, under certain il-
logical and productive conditions, the social grouping
called parties arises. One of its primary functions is to
resist a change in the distributive processes of that society
or if this is regarded as an unwise course of action, then
to channel the changes so that relative power positions are
retained as long as possible by those who are on top of the
social structure. These are the internally created parties
of parliamentary origin. The reaction to this new phenomenon
on the part of those seeking distributive system changes
through a change in class system emphasis are the parties of
extra-parliamentary origin of Maurice Duverger. 31 Related
to these concepts of party origins are Duverger ' s "caucus,
branch, cell and militia units of local party organization"
and his "cadre" and "mass" concepts which refer to the social
status of the individual member, his position in the dominant
class system(s), and to the size of the local unit of the
32party. Thus the variables of class system competition and
ideological cycles provide a dynamic dimension to the
31These are the central concepts in Duverger ' s static
explanation of the origins of political parties. Political
Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State
,
trans, by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. V-XXXVII.
32 lb id
.
, Book I, pp. 4-202.
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explanation of party origins, local organization, and nature
of basic unit organization which the structural frameworks
of Duverger lack.
In addition to these dimensions of party, Duverger
discusses both the degree of participation in party activities
of the individual member. He suggests that this activity
can be seen as consisting of "electors, supporters and mili-
3 3tants." m addition, the quality of membership is class-
ified as that of "community, association and order." 34 Ad-
ditional understanding of these elements of party is fur-
thered by the introduction of the concept of power classes
or classes as developed by Lenski, 35 and the idea of "citi-
zenship as a class-based political resource" developed by
36T. H. Marshall. it is to these elements we now turn.
Class and Distributive Systems
The concept of class or power class is defined by Lenski
as being "an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in
33
Ibid.
, pp. 90-115.
34 Ibid.
, pp. 116-132.
•^Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of
Social Stratification
, pp. 74-79.
See his essay "Citizenship and Social Class," in Class
,
Citizenship and Social Development
,
(Garden City, N. Y.
:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964).
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a similar position with respect to force or some specific
form of institutionalized power." 37 These persons occupy
specific class rankings in all of the class systems of the
society of which they are a member. in addition, the in-
dividual will often be subject to status inconsistency be-
cause of differing class rankings within the various class
systems. This is especially valid in modern industrial
societies because of the multiplicity of class systems in
these "developed" 38 nations. it is quite possible that this
inconsistency is the primary motivational force which pushes
men who are in the top classes in a class system which does
not give its leaders major access to power, to push for a
redefinition of what constitutes the dominant class system
for that society. Political parties serve as the institu-
tional framework for such efforts. As Lenski suggests, this
motivation goes a long way in explaining the actions of the
intelligensia class of the educational class system whom
Karl Marx suggests will lead the proletariat in its devel-
opment of a true class consciousness. 3 ^
37 Lenski, p. 75.
38JOThe term "developed" is used here in a value neutral
sense to describe the characteristic of a society's instit-
utional complexity. This non-normative usage is discussed
by Seymour M. Lipset in the Introduction to T. H. Marshall,
p. VIII.
39
Lenski, p. 88.
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One important development in modern industrial society
is the universal nature of the class of citizenship. 40
In earlier periods, when this resource was not shared by all
and when there were different degrees of citizenship such as
enfranchised, unenfranchised, resident aliens, slaves and
regime enemies, citizenship served as a basis for a very im-
portant class system. This system dimension has mostly dis-
appeared with the developments in warfare, literacy and com-
munications which accompanied the Industrial Revolution.
Citizenship as a resource now becomes almost universal in
its distribution; is no longer a class system but a class.
Even though citizenship is no longer the basis for a
class system but rather is a single class phenomenon, it
continues to generate a high degree of social tension in
individual societies because of its potential as a claim
for power changes and as a vehicle for organizational attempts
to change the legitimate surplus distribution patterns
through social organization. This is explained by Lenski
as being due to the fact that:
those (in a society) who lack other kinds of resources
together with those who, for ideological reasons,
believe in social equality, have combined to fight
for the enhancement of the value of citizenship
4Q Ibid
. , pp. 82-84, 428-430.
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at the expense of those resources which generate
inequality. i
He continues by saying that the conflict normally revolves
around the question of emphasis upon the traditional rights
of property versus the newer rights of citizenship. This
controversy is useful in explaining the existence of two-
and multi-party systems in those nations with a capitalistic
type of economic ideology and organization. The emphasis
in this ideology upon individual and partisan group compe-
tition conflicts with the egalitarian tendencies of the
values of citizenship. Thus these societies exhibit a pat-
tern of competition which pits an economic class system
against a political class. This type of competition is in
contrast to the competitive situation described above which
occurs in those societies such as China or Soviet Russia
where the political class system is dominant and the struggles
over distributive patterns are of an inter-class nature. A
third possible competitive pattern is that which occurred
shortly after the first appearance of parties; the inter-
class systems struggles between the economic and the pol-
itical class systems. This inter-class system struggle also
appears present in many nations with developing economies
41* Ibid.
, p. 83.
162
where the commitment to socialism does not approach totality
and where the political dimension of the society is still
at the class system level. m these societies, citizenship
as a resource is beginning to be seen by more people as a
base from which to demand re-distribution of the social
product. Parties are the means of social organization to
accomplish this goal. Many parties of Africa and Asia
appear to demonstrate this pattern of conflict over social
rewards
.
A fourth type of social-political conflict is that be-
tween different classes which are also part of different
class systems. This type of conflict is evident in the party
development of much of Latin America. in these situations
the upper classes of the property class system dominate an
executive centered government while the commercial and pro-
fessional classes seek power through an expanded role of
their party organizations in the legislatures. 42
Thus the rise and evolution of modern industrial society
has generated four different patterns of political struggle,
all revolving around the nature of the distributive system
and the institutional means, political parties, by which the
status quo is protected, and change is pushed for. These
42See the article by Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties
and Policy-making in Latin America" in Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 331-367.
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four patterns are (1) inter-class system conflict, (2) inter-
class conflicts within a single class system, (3) class sys-
tem versus class conflicts, and (4) class versus class con-
flicts of an inter class system variety. This simple class-
ification scheme allows us to generate a cross-national,
ideological and cultural perspective on parties, a perspective
which is lacking in the Marxian and mandate explanations.
PjL^Y_Pa3:ticipation and Membership
In his analysis of individual party member degree of
participation (militant, members and supporters) and the
quality of membership (community, association and order)
,
Duvorger provides a static taxonomy. By linking these con-
cepts to the ideas of single, dominant, dual competetive,
and fragmented ideologies, and the Lenski insight concerning
the legitimizing cycle of might-right-might.
. . , it should
be possible to generate heuristic insights and eventually
testable hypotheses bearing upon the individual party mem-
ber's perceptions and activities, and his degree of personal
attachment to the party. This is possible because of the
imposition of the dynamism of intra-soc ietal group competition
over the nature and/or extent of the distributive system for
that particular society. It is perhaps in this area of
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inquiry that some of the most fruitful efforts toward a
general theory of political parties might proceed.
TheJJ^mamlcs of Political Development
An example of the utility of our approach is in the
area of political development43 as this term applies to the
relationship of parties to the broader social processes of
modernization. 44 As LaPalombara and Weiner suggest, 45 any
polity, as it evolves from traditional to more developed
governmental forms, passes through crises of legitimacy,
integration and participation. These political crises are
in turn related to questions of distribution of material
wealth.
Mass externally created parties ideologically
committed to a greater satisfaction of distributive
demands continue to exert magnetic attraction for
millions of voters. On the other side, forces
unwilling to accede to distributive demands tend to
protect what power they have be recommending the
suppression of opposition parties. 46
43See the excellent cross polity study of Joseph LaPolombara
and Myron Weiner, eds
.
, Political Parties and Political Devel-
°HI!£nt.. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
44We use the concept "modernization" in the economic sense
of a polity which strives to achieve a level of economic de-
velopment such that a surplus of wants is readily available
and demand creation is seen as being necessary to dispose of
both wants and needs
.
45LaPalombara and Weiner, see especially Chapter 1 and
the conclusion.
4 6Ibid
. , p. 29.
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This situation is suggested to exist in Franco and Italy
and to threaten the existence of a continued competitive
party system. Both of these polities exhibit fragmented
.ideological patterns and dedicated groups of militants as
party members. A different pattern is demonstrated in the
United States where a dominant ideological context exists
with two large parties comprised mainly of supporters, a
few members, and a very few militants. in Italy and France
the distributive controversy pits the economic class system
against the political class striving for a broader definition
of citizenship. In the United States a similar class-system
versus class contest in a different ideological context
suggests that system stability is not so much a question of
the number of parties or the wealth distribution patterns
as it is the extent to which a single, or a dominant ideology
is successful as a means of legitimizing the distribution of
power, privilege and prestige. The next step in variable
recognition would seem to be a systematic look at the class
and class system struggles from the perspective of the ideo-
logical complexion of many diverse polities.
Retrospect and Prospect
We began this essay by suggesting that the existing
general theories of political parties were inadequate and
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.restricted. The explanation provided by Karl Marx excludes
those parties and party systems which are non-Marxian. The
mandate explanation is also narrow in that Marxian type
parties are excluded. Thus both explanations are mutually
exclusive. in addition, the Marxian explanation, while of
broad or general range, is a normative construct based upon
an assumption of private ownership of property as being il-
legal. But Marx does not recognize that legality is a soc-
ially defined legal condition. The mandate explanation is
of middle range generality and its supporters are ambiguous
as to its epistemological foundations.
The explanatory framework of Maurice Duverger avoids
most of the weaknesses of the mandate and Marxian explan-
ations of parties and party systems. It is empirically
based, is inclusive in taxonomy, and of middle range. His
explanation is, however, static rather than dynamic in that
social processes are mainly ignored. Duverger 1 s work does
very little to assist us in answering the question, "Why?
We have suggested that a possible avenue for advancement
toward an eventual general party theory is to utilize the
social forces as stated and implied by Gerhard Lenski in his
analysis of the structures and dynamics of social distribution
systems. This approach bridges the gap between the Marxian
and mandate explanations of parties, and in addition, is not
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based upon normative assumptions. Our framework for further
analysis is still of the middle range of theorizing but pro-
vides avenues for variable identification and eventually
measurement which the Duverger approach does not. The con-
ceptualization level is analytical in that human activity
patterns, rather than persons as entities, are dealt with.
Thus our approach should further the efforts at general
political party theory generation.
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